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Abstract 
  We present a new  measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against 
expropriation by corporate insiders: the anti-self-dealing index.  Assembled with the help of Lex 
Mundi law firms, the index is calculated for 72 countries based on legal rules prevailing in 2003, 
and focuses on private enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure, approval, and litigation, 
governing a specific self-dealing transaction.  This theoretically-grounded index predicts a 
variety of stock market outcomes, and generally works better than the previously introduced 
index of anti-director rights.  
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1. Introduction. 
Over the last twenty years, both academic and practical approaches to corporate 
governance have increasingly focused on the problem of investor expropriation, sometimes also 
referred to as self-dealing or tunneling.  Specifically, those who control a corporation, whether 
they are managers, controlling shareholders, or both, can use their power to divert corporate 
wealth to themselves, without sharing it with the other investors.  Various forms of such self-
dealing include executive perquisites to excessive compensation, transfer pricing, taking of 
corporate opportunities, self-serving financial transactions such as directed equity issuance or 
personal loans to insiders, and outright theft of corporate assets (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).    
The new emphasis on self-dealing is reflected in both theoretical and empirical work.  
Earlier research on corporate governance has focused on such problems as managerial 
consumption of perquisites (Jensen and Meckling 1976), managerial effort (Holmstrom 1979), 
and over-investment in pursuit of growth (Baumol 1959, Jensen 1986).  Modern theory of 
corporate finance instead focuses on the ability of corporate insiders to divert corporate wealth to 
themselves, reflected in the diplomatically named “private benefits of control” (Grossman and 
Hart 1988, Hart 1995, Zingales 1994).  Empirically, such diversion of resources from firms to 
their controllers has been investigated in several contexts, including the U.S. savings and loans 
crisis (Akerlof and Romer 1993), the Mexican and Asian financial crises (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Zamarripa 2003, Johnson et al. 2000a), legal disputes over tunneling (Johnson et al. 
2000b), and corporate governance during the transition from socialism (Glaeser, Johnson, and 
Shleifer 2001).  The extent of diversion has also been measured by estimating the private 
benefits of control from the market pricing of shares with superior voting rights and from the 
treatment of controlling shareholders in takeovers (Nenova 2003, Dyck and Zingales 2004).   2
Parallel to this recognition of the importance of corporate self-dealing, economists have 
followed legal scholars (Clark 1986) in emphasizing the crucial role played by the law in its 
control.  Initial research in this area argues theoretically and shows empirically that differences 
in legal investor protection across countries shape the ability of insiders to expropriate outsiders, 
and thus determine investor confidence in markets and consequently their development (Shleifer 
and Vishny 1997, La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002).  Yet while this 
research presents several empirical measures of investor protection that predict financial 
outcomes, it does not focus on self-dealing explicitly.  In this paper, we rectify this omission.   
What should be the role of the law in addressing corporate self-dealing?  One approach is 
to do nothing, and to count on market forces to sort out the problem. Virtually no society uses 
this approach: the temptation to “take the money and run” in an unregulated environment is just 
too great.  At the other extreme, a society can prohibit conflicted transactions altogether: all 
dealings between a corporation and its controllers – or any other entity these controllers also 
control – could be banned by law.  Yet no society finds it practical to use this approach either, 
perhaps because in many instances related-party transactions actually make economic sense.  So 
what do societies actually do? 
In this paper, we explore this question empirically. To this end, we describe a 
hypothetical self-dealing transaction between two firms controlled by the same person, which 
can in principle be used to improperly enrich this person.  We then ask attorneys from Lex 
Mundi law firms in 102 countries to describe in detail how each country’s legal system regulates 
this transaction.  In principle, several approaches can be used.  One approach is to facilitate 
private enforcement of good behavior.  This approach emphasizes extensive disclosure (sunshine 
as the best disinfectant), approval procedures for transactions, and facilitation of private litigation   3
when self-dealing is suspected.  In this approach, the government moves beyond laissez-faire and 
regulates the contracting framework, but leaves enforcement to private parties.  Another 
approach is to rely on public enforcement, including fines and prison terms for self-dealing. 
From the detailed answers supplied by Lex Mundi attorneys, we construct numerical measures of 
the intensity of regulation of self-dealing along a variety of dimensions, covering both public and 
private enforcement.  The anti-self-dealing indices are constructed for 72 countries.  These data 
enable us to address three broad sets of questions concerning the regulation of corporate self-
dealing in different societies.  
First, we ask what factors determine the structure of the regulation of self-dealing in 
different countries.  In previous work, we have argued that the country’s legal origin, including 
the common law, French civil law, German civil law, Scandinavian law, and Socialist law, is an 
important determinant of the country’s strategy for protecting investors.  We found systematic 
differences among legal origins in the protection of both minority shareholders and creditors 
through corporate and bankruptcy laws (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, Djankov et al. 2007) and in 
the regulation of security issuance through security laws (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer 2006).   In this paper, we develop measures of investor protection more directly aimed at 
the control of self-dealing, and examine their variation across legal origins.   
 Second, we examine whether the anti-self-dealing measures we construct are related to 
the development of financial markets, and if so which measures are related to which financial 
outcomes.  This enables us to evaluate alternative strategies of regulation of self-dealing from 
both the scientific and the policy perspectives.  
Third, we compare the performance of alternative measures of shareholder protection as 
predictors of financial development.  To this end, we first present revised estimates of the anti-  4
director rights index of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) for our larger sample of countries.  Several 
authors have criticized this index for both its ad hoc nature (which the creation of our anti-self-
dealing index is designed to address), and for several conceptual ambiguities and outright 
mistakes in coding (Pagano and Volpin 2005, Spamann 2005).   Here we address these concerns, 
and then examine the predictive powers of the revised anti-director rights index, the anti-self-
dealing index, and two measures of investor protection derived from securities laws (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2006).  In addition, we compare the legal predictors of financial 
development with some alternative candidates, such as taxation, media, and politics.   
As a last note, we emphasize that we consider garden-variety self-dealing transactions, in 
which the controllers of companies make choices that may benefit them at the expense of other 
investors, but follow the law regarding disclosure and approval procedures.  We do not address 
cases of corporate crime such as Enron or Parmalat.  To deter such cases, every country uses 
harsh criminal punishments.  We are interested in a different situation: if a controlling 
shareholder wants to enrich himself while following the law, how difficult is it for minority 
shareholders to thwart the deal before it goes through and to recover damages if it is carried out?   
 
2. Methodology.   
Our data are based on answers to a questionnaire completed by attorneys from Lex 
Mundi law firms.  Lex Mundi is an association of international law firms with members in 108 
countries.  We invited Lex Mundi firms to participate in the project and received complete 
answers from 102 of them.  After processing the respondents’ answers, we conducted follow-up 
conference calls to seek clarifications and asked respondents to confirm our coding of the data.  
The sample we use in this paper is based on the answers of 72 respondents who have confirmed   5
the validity of our data.  The countries included in the sample represent 99.3% of total world 
market capitalization in 2003.   
A key contribution of this paper is to construct an index of the strength of minority 
shareholder protection against self-dealing by the controlling shareholder (anti-self-dealing 
index).  Our earlier index of anti-director rights (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998) was based on an ad-
hoc collection of variables meant to capture the stance of corporate law toward shareholder 
protection.  The present index addresses the ways in which the law deals with corporate self-
dealing in a more theoretically grounded way.  Specifically, we start with a fixed self-dealing 
transaction, and then measure the hurdles that the controlling shareholder must jump in order to 
get away with this transaction.  The higher the hurdles, the higher the anti-self-dealing index is
1.    
As a first step, we describe to the Lex Mundi law firms the stylized transaction between 
two companies (“Buyer” and “Seller”) illustrated in Figure I.  We specify that Mr. James owns 
90% of Seller and 60% of Buyer, and that the latter is a publicly-traded firm.  James is a director 
of Buyer, has appointed 2 directors to Buyer’s 5-member board of directors, and his son is its 
CEO.   Seller operates a chain of retail hardware stores and has recently shut down many stores.  
As a result, some trucks in Seller’s fleet are not being used.  James proposes that Buyer 
purchases Seller’s idle trucks for a cash payment equivalent to 10% of Buyer’s assets (the 
transaction).
2  He argues that Buyer could use additional trucks to expand its sales.  All required 
approvals are obtained and all mandatory disclosures are made.  If allowed to vote, James casts 
the deciding vote in favor of the transaction.  James is on both sides of the transaction and could 
                                                 
1 A possible limitation of this methodology is that the law on the books, which we measure, does not reflect the full 
legal environment, and that the practice of enforcement matters as much or more.  We control for the general quality 
of law enforcement in our regressions.  Perhaps as important, a decade of research in this area suggests that, while 
the quality of enforcement surely matters, so do the legal rules themselves.   This paper, then, provides further 
evidence on the potential importance of legal rules, without in any way downplaying enforcement.    
2 We explicitly assume that the transaction is part of Buyer’s ordinary course of business and is not ultra vires (i.e., 
is not outside the power or authority of Buyer Co.).     6
benefit if Buyer overpays for Seller’s trucks.  In fact, under our case facts, a $100 wealth transfer 
from Buyer to Seller would reduce the value of James’ equity in Buyer by $60 but increase the 
value of his equity in Seller by $90.  Although the proposed transaction has a possible business 
purpose, it involves an obvious conflict of interest.   
To gather data on the regulation of self-dealing, we designed an extensive questionnaire 
and tested it on nine Lex Mundi firms.  A revised questionnaire was sent to all Lex Mundi firms.  
The lawyers received the case study and were asked to describe the minimum legal requirements 
in force in May 2003 regarding: (1) who approves the transactions; (2) what needs to be 
disclosed to the board of directors or supervisory board, the shareholders, the stock exchange, 
and the regulators; (3) what are the duties of officers, directors, and controlling shareholders; (4) 
how the transaction’s validity could be challenged; (5) what causes of action are available if 
Buyer suffers damages; (6) what needs to be proved under each cause of action; (7) who has 
standing to sue under each available cause of action; (8) availability of direct and derivative 
suits; (9) access to information and discovery rights; and (10) fines and criminal sanctions. 
The lawyers based their answers on all binding (i.e., not voluntary guidelines or codes of 
best practice) laws and regulations applicable under our case facts and substantiated their 
answers with references to all relevant legal provisions
3.   In addition, they provided the text of 
laws, statutes, judicial precedent, and regulatory opinions used to answer our questionnaire.   
Sources of law typically incuded: (1) company act; (2) civil and commercial code; (3) case law 
and judicial precedent; (4) stock market act and regulations; (5) stock exchange listing rules; (6) 
civil procedure code; and (7) criminal code.  We read the relevant laws and coded the 
respondents’ answers.  Finally, we emailed our coding of the data to the respondents and held 
                                                 
3 We treat all sources of law – from precedents to stock exchange listing rules – equally, even though legal 
scholarship has often emphasized the differences among them from the perspective of the need for state intervention.   
Our interest is in the rules rather than in the source of their propagation.    7
conference calls with every country to confirm our interpretation of their answers and to make 
sure that our coding of the data is comparable across countries.  
 
The Regulation of Self-Dealing 
In theory, the law can regulate a transaction involving conflicts of interest so that it 
replicates the terms and conditions that would exist in an arm’s-length transaction. The law can 
also empower minority shareholders to seek remedy for expropriation through the courts or to 
provide fines and criminal sanctions to those who expropriate.  Below we describe our approach 
to organizing the data.  The exact definitions of the variables are contained in Table I. 
    We examine several areas of law relevant to the transaction and summarize them with 
one index of investor protection against self-dealing and one of public enforcement.  To measure 
the role of private enforcement, we keep track of  disclosure and approval requirements imposed 
by law before Buyer may legally acquire Seller’s trucks and of immediate disclosures after the 
decision to enter into the transaction has been made.  Since even a duly approved and disclosed 
transaction may damage Buyer, litigation may be necessary to obtain restitution.  Accordingly, 
we also keep track of how easy it is for minority shareholders to obtain redress through the 
courts when the transaction damages Buyer if all disclosure and approval requirements are met.  
The last assumption is crucial since the laws of most countries provide harsh penalties for 
breaking disclosure and approval requirements.  Factors that affect the odds that the plaintiff 
prevails in court include liability standards and the right to compel evidence.  
In addition to looking at measuring private enforcement, we capture the strength of public 
enforcement by keeping track of the fines and sanctions that may be applicable to James and 
those in charge of approving the transaction.      8
To be more specific, begin with private enforcement.  The first area that the law may seek 
to regulate is the approval process.  The basic choice is whether the transaction requires approval 
by disinterested shareholders or alternatively may be approved by the CEO, the board of 
directors (a majority of whose members were by case assumptions appointed by the controlling 
shareholder who is on both sides of the transaction), or the shareholder meeting where the 
controlling shareholder votes.  An important assumption in our case facts is that all related 
parties (i.e., controlling shareholder, CEO, and interested directors) vote in favor of the 
transaction whenever legally possible even when doing so may expose them to greater litigation 
risk.  Prudence might require greater caution, but we focus on the letter of the law. For this 
reason, we separate disinterested shareholder approval as the purest case of arms-length 
endorsement of the transaction.   
Another critical way in which the law may seek to regulate the approval process is by 
mandating extensive disclosures by the company and the related party on the view that "sunshine 
is the best disinfectant" (Brandeis 1914).  We keep track of the extent of disclosures by Buyer 
and the controlling shareholder before the transaction goes through.
4  Finally, before the 
transaction is approved, the law may require a review by independent third parties (e.g., financial 
experts) who make available a report on the transaction and may act as a check on the 
opportunism of the insiders.  We summarize our data on approval requirements and immediate 
disclosures through an index of ex-ante private control of self-dealing by investors. 
We do not wish to suggest, in this definition of ex ante control, that the main reason why 
ex ante disclosure and shareholder voting might work is the sophistication of small shareholders.  
                                                 
4 Empirical studies of disclosure center on the effect of disclosure requirements imposed by securities laws on stock 
market outcomes.  The early empirical literature was inconclusive (Stigler 1964, Benston 1973). Recent studies find 
that mandatory disclosure rules are associated with larger stock markets in a cross-section of countries (La Porta et 
al. 2006) and higher market valuations in the US (Greenstone et al. 2006).       9
These practices might instead work because, when problematic deals are publicly disclosed, they 
are criticized in the press (Dyck and Zingales 2004) or stimulate the activism of large outside 
shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny 1986).  Each of these mechanisms is less likely to come into 
play when self-dealing transactions are only disclosed to and approved by the board.  
The second area that the law may seek to regulate is the ease with which minority 
shareholders can prove wrongdoing.  First, disclosure requirements in annual reports and 
periodic filings may facilitate the scrutiny of related-party transactions by outside shareholders. 
The extent of such disclosure varies across jurisdictions.   
Second, in most jurisdictions, any damage that the transaction causes is assigned to Buyer 
rather than to any individual shareholders.  Since Buyer is unlikely to pursue legal action that 
would harm its controlling shareholder, we measure the obstacles (e.g., high ownership 
requirements) faced by minority shareholders to gain standing to sue on behalf of Buyer.  The 
cost of private enforcement increases with the obstacles faced by minority shareholders to sue 
derivatively.   
Third, courts may void the transaction in cases of approval that is in bad faith or 
negligent, or alternatively when the transaction is merely unfair or involves a conflict of interest 
and damages the company. Similarly, James and Buyer’s directors may be liable for damages if 
it can be proved that: (1) they acted in bad faith; or (2) they acted with negligence; or (3) that the 
transaction was unfair or involved a conflict of interest.  Private enforcement is more costly 
when plaintiffs need to prove bad faith on the part of James or directors than when they are 
merely required to show that the transaction involved a conflict of interest.  
      Fourth, plaintiffs are more likely to prevail if access to evidence is extensive. We 
consider three aspects of access to evidence: 1) whether plaintiffs can request the court to   10
appoint an inspector to examine the affairs of the company; 2) whether plaintiffs must identify 
(e.g., by providing title and author) the specific documents that they seek to review; and 3) 
whether plaintiffs can directly question defendants and non-parties in court.  We combine our 
proxies for ex-post disclosure and the ease of proving wrongdoing into an index of ex-post 
private control of self-dealing.   
Finally, we create an anti-self-dealing index by averaging the indices of ex-ante and ex-
post private control of self-dealing. 
We next consider public enforcement.  The law may deter wrongdoing by sanctioning the 
controlling shareholder and those who approved the transaction with fines and prison terms.  We 
collect data on public enforcement under two alternative scenarios.  First,  we  measure the 
sanctions that apply to James and those who approved the transaction if all disclosure and 
approval requirements have been met.  In this situation, fines and criminal sanctions apply to 
behavior ranging from criminal intent to obtain unlawful profits to breaches of duties of care and 
loyalty.  To illustrate the scope of such sanctions, consider an example.  Under our case facts, 
James abstains from a board vote on the proposed transaction if legally required to do so.  While 
abstaining from voting, James can still influence other members of the board to approve the 
transaction so that he can obtain a personal benefit at the expense of the company.  In Belgium, 
the directors who approved the transaction – but not James – will face criminal sanctions for 
misuse of company assets.  James does face criminal sanctions in Sweden if he intentionally 
caused damage to the company. The scope of criminal sanctions is wider in Germany where 
members of the management board can be criminally liable for breach of trust if they violate 
their duty to care for the assets of the company and the company suffers damages. We keep track 
of maximum fines and prison terms applicable for such violations of the law.    11
In addition, most countries impose severe criminal sanctions when the transaction has 
been approved in violation of the law.  We keep track of the prison term that applies to James if 
– in violation of the law of most countries -- he does not disclose his conflict of interest and 
Buyer carries out the transaction.  
 
3. Regulation of Self-Dealing Across Countries.  
Table II presents our data on approval and immediate disclosure requirements.  Countries 
are arranged by legal origin, and we report the means for each legal origin and the tests of the 
differences in these means.   
Two examples, Italy and the UK, illustrate our data and empirical approach.  Italy ranks 
35
th on our anti-self-dealing index, and is representative of civil law countries.  The UK ranks 
3
rd, and most common law countries (but not the US) model their regulation of self-dealing on 
the UK.  Briefly, related party transactions in Italy are approved by disinterested directors, not 
shareholders.  Most of the disclosure regarding related party transactions takes place in periodic 
filings.  When related-party transactions cause damage to the firm, the cost of private litigation is 
very high.  In contrast, related-party transactions in the UK are reviewed by independent 
financial experts and approved by disinterested shareholders.  Extensive disclosure takes place 
both before and after the transaction is approved.   However, as in Italy, litigation in the UK is 
costly.  To substantiate these claims, we next discuss these two countries in more detail.     
In Italy, James, as an interested director of Buyer, has to notify the other directors as well 
as the internal auditor of his interest in the transaction (i.e., his relation to and ownership in 
Seller), and abstain from participating in the decision.  Moreover, because James is a director of 
Buyer, the transaction must be approved by Buyer’s disintereseted directors – but not   12
disinterested shareholders.  In addition, Buyer’s internal auditor is required to attend the meeting 
of the board of directors and review the transaction.  
Once the board of directors approves the transaction, Buyer has fifteen days to make  
public a document describing it.  This document must include: (1) a description of the assets 
purchased by Buyer; (2) the nature and amount of consideration paid by Buyer to Seller; (3) an 
explanation or justification for the price paid by Buyer for Seller’s assets; (4)  the fact that James 
owns 60% of Buyer; (5) the fact that James owns 90% of Seller; and (6) all facts about the 
transaction that a reasonable person would believe to be material.   
Gaining standing to sue is straigthforward in Italy.  Any shareholder or group of 
shareholders owning 5% of the shares in the company may sue the directors on behalf of Buyer.  
However, shareholders would rarely exercise their right to sue as their odds of prevailing in court 
are slim.  First, the transaction cannot generally be voided or rescinded provided that it was 
approved by disinterested directors and all required disclosures were made.  Second, holding 
disinterested directors liable for damages requires proving that they acted negligently and that 
their actions caused damages to Buyer.  Italian courts have stated that, generally, directors cannot 
be held liable on the merit of their actions, provided that they acted with care, diligence and in a 
professional manner.  Third, James cannot be held liable if he has abstained from voting.   
Shareholders in Italy may have a hard time gaining access to the information required to 
prove that Buyer’s disinterested directors acted negligently.  First, in case of a well-founded 
suspicion of serious irregularities in directors’ conduct, shareholders holding 5% of the shares 
can report the facts to the court.  The court can then order an investigation of the Company’s 
management at the expense of the claiming shareholders.  Second, the plaintiff’s request for 
documents must specifically identify the document(s) sought (e.g., indicate title, author, date,   13
and contents).  Third, the Judge – not the plaintiff -- is in charge of questioning non-party 
witnesses.  Fourth, normally parties (e.g., plaintiffs) are not permitted to give evidence in the 
case.  When they are allowed to testify, the questioning of parties follows the same procedures as 
that of non-parties.   
Criminal sanctions and fines generally apply in case of fraud.  James may be convicted 
for up to three years if he does not disclose his conflict of interest and the transaction is carried 
out by Buyer.  In contrast, criminal sanctions and fines are unavailable if all disclosure and 
approval requirements have been met.    
To wrap up the review of Italy, the regulation of self-dealing in Italy is solely based on 
trusting disclosure after the fact and on disinterested directors doing the “right thing”.  In this 
regard, disinterested directors are unlikely to be found negligent if they lend their support to a 
transaction which, while favoring James, has a plausible business purpose.  At the same time, 
disinterested directors owe their position on Buyer’s board to James.    
In the U.K., modern regulation of self-dealing evolved from the common law equitable 
rule that directors, being subject to fiduciary duties, could not enter into engagements with their 
company when they had or could have had a conflicting personal interest or a conflict with the 
interests of those they were bound to protect.  This “no conflict” rule was subject to an important 
exception: conflicted contracting was permitted provided that the conflict of interest was 
disclosed in advance to the shareholders, who then approved the transaction.  The scope of this 
rule was enormous.  The requirement of shareholder approval did not require showing an actual 
conflict of interest between the company and the director (a potential for conflict was enough).   
Nor was it necessary to show that the conflict had an impact on the terms of the transaction.  All 
self-dealing transactions required shareholder approval even if they appeared fair.    14
As discussed in Davies (2002), during the nineteenth century the rule of equity lost its 
bite as courts came to accept that shareholder approval for self-interested transactions could be 
granted in general, rather than for specific transactions, in the articles of association.  Provisions 
began to appear in these articles permitting the board to contract on behalf of its members.  But 
legislators stepped in to put constraints on self-dealing.  Statues and regulations currently in 
force require that our hypothetical transaction be approved by both Buyer’s board of directors 
and its shareholders for two reasons (1) because it is a substantial property transaction (i.e., 
exceeds £100,000 or 10 per cent of the company’s asset value) involving directors, and (2) 
because it is a transaction with a related party
5.  Moreover, under stock exchange listing rules, 
James must abstain from voting at the shareholder meeting.  Extensive mandatory disclosures 
ensure that disinterested shareholders are knowledgeable about the transaction before they vote 
to approve it.  Specifically, Buyer must send a circular to shareholders containing not only all 
material information regarding the nature and extent of any interests of its directors in the 
transaction, but also a statement by the disinterested directors that the transaction is fair and 
reasonable and that the directors have been so advised by an independent adviser acceptable to 
the UK Listing Authority.  Finally, James and any director who is in any way directly or 
indirectly interested in the proposed contract must make “full and frank” disclosure of the 
existence and nature of that interest at a board meeting.   
  Once the transaction is approved by shareholders, the next annual report must contain the 
particulars of its principal terms (including the director’s name, the nature of his interest, and the 
value of the transaction).  
If the transaction is properly approved with full disclosure, disgruntled shareholders will 
find it hard to challenge it in court.  They must first gain standing to sue.  In principle, any 
                                                 
5 Section 320 of the Companies Act of 1985 and 11.4 of the Listing Rules.   15
shareholder may sue James and the directors on behalf of Buyer if there has been a fraud on the 
minority (i.e., the majority of the shareholders succeeded in expropriating at the expense of the 
minority the money, property or advantages of the company) and the wrongdoers are in control 
of the company.  Proving fraud is complicated and rarely tried.  Plaintiffs may also have trouble 
persuading a court that James is “in control” if a majority of disinterested shareholders have 
voted for the transaction.
6  If minority shareholders win, the court may make any order – 
including rescission -- it sees fit to give them relief when the company is run in a manner 
unfairly prejudicial to their interests.  Courts may also hold James liable if he uses his powers to 
benefit himself at the expense of the company.  Finally, shareholders may recover profits and 
damages from directors who failed to exercise adequate care and skill or had a conflict of interest 
and failed to act in the best interest of the company.  In general, English courts do not correct a 
"bad bargain" but do intervene in fraud.  In practice, this means that, absent a failure to disclose 
material information, directors are unlikely to face liability when the transaction was reviewed 
by independent financial experts and approved by disinterested shareholders. 
Aggrieved shareholders in the UK have extensive access to information both before and 
during proceedings.  First, shareholders may request that the Secretary of State appoint an 
inspector if the company’s affairs are being or have been, inter alia, conducted in a manner 
which is unfairly prejudicial to some shareholders.  Second, once in court, the plaintiff does not 
have to specifically identify the document sought (by indicating the title, author, date, etc) but 
can rather request categories of documents pertinent to the case.  Third, the claimant can cross-
examine both a defendant and a non-party witness on his witness statement or any other evidence 
he has given in direct examination without prior approval by the court of the questions posed. 
                                                 
6We follow our respondents and code UK standing to sue as 1, since it is possible to sue.  In reality, dissenting 
shareholders have a hard time gaining standing.  The results do not change if we change coding for the UK.     16
James faces stiff criminal sanctions (7 years) if he does not report his conflict of interest.  
In contrast, absent fraud or breach of the law, no criminal sanctions or fines apply to either James 
or Buyer’s directors.   
In summary, the strength of the regulation of self-dealing in the UK lies in the heightened 
scrutiny of transactions involving related parties before they may be approved rather than in 
favoring litigation by minority shareholders.  This has led legal scholars to remark that 
“…judicial assessment of the fairness of self-dealing transactions has not been a significant part 
of British law” (Davies, 2002, page 171).  In fact, minority shareholders face a high burden of 
proof in challenging the transaction because it was approved by disinterested shareholders with 
both the advice of independent financial experts and full disclosure of all material information.    
The difference between Italy and the UK is representative of broader patterns.  Turning to 
Table II, the most pronounced differences are between civil and common law countries.   
Differences among civil law systems are seldom statistically significant and we do not focus on 
them.   Disinterested shareholders must approve the transaction in 48% of common law countries 
but only 16% of civil law countries.  In contrast, the CEO may single-handedly approve the 
transaction in 20% of civil law countries but never in common law countries.   
Turning to disclosure, we keep track of the disclosures that need to be made by Buyer as 
well as by James before the transaction is approved.  The disclosure indices range from 0 (no 
disclosure) to a perfect score of 1 (full disclosure).  Buyer is required to make full disclosure in 
57% of common law countries, but in only 25% of civil law countries.  This pattern is reflected 
in the index of disclosure requirements by Buyer, which takes value of 0.62 in common law 
countries and 0.37 in civil law ones.  Similarly, James also faces more extensive disclosure 
requirements in common law countries than in civil law ones (0.95 vs. 0.55).  Consistent with   17
this pattern, an independent review of the transaction is required in 48% of common law 
countries but only 24% of civil law ones.  We summarize these results with the index of ex-ante 
disclosure requirements.   This index ranges from 0 in Austria and Ecuador to 1 in Chile and the 
UK, and averages 0.68 in common law countries but only 0.38 in civil law ones. 
The index of ex-ante private control of self-dealing summarizes the approval and 
disclosure requirements for our hypothetical transaction.  Common law countries typically 
require both extensive disclosures and the approval of the transaction by disinterested 
shareholders (the ex-ante private control of self-dealing index equals 0.58).  In contrast, civil law 
countries typically have fewer disclosure requirements and entrust the approval of self-dealing 
transactions to the CEO or the board of directors (the ex-ante index equals 0.27).   
Table III presents our data on the ease with which minority shareholders may prove 
wrongdoing by James and the approving body.  The index of disclosure in periodic filings ranges 
from 0 (no disclosure) to a perfect score of 1 (full disclosure).  Buyer is required to make full 
disclosure in 43% of common law countries, but in only 12% of civil law ones.   Shareholders 
controlling 10% of the stock can sue James and the other directors in 90% of common law 
countries and in roughly 80% of Scandinavian and German legal origin countries.  In contrast, 
shareholders have standing to sue in only 56% of French civil law countries.  Rescinding the 
transaction is impossible in 66% of civil law countries and requires proving fraud in the 
remaining 28%.  In contrast, only two common law countries make rescission is unavailable, and 
only additional four limit it to cases of fraud.  In the remaining fifteen, plaintiffs face a lower 
hurdle than fraud to rescind the transaction.    
Likewise, it is typically easier to hold James and members of the approving body liable in 
common law countries than in civil law ones.  For example, James may be held liable if the   18
transaction is unfair or prejudicial – the least demanding standard – in 6% of civil law countries 
and 52% of common law ones.  Here Scandinavian legal origin countries are an exception among 
civil law countries: it is significantly easier to hold James liable in Scandinavian civil law 
countries than in French and German civil law ones.  Access to evidence is also sharply higher in 
common law countries than in civil law ones (0.75 vs. 0.49).  Once again, Scandinavian legal 
origin countries are an exception among civil law countries: access to evidence in Scandinavian 
legal origin countries is comparable to that in common law countries.  The index of ease of 
proving wrongdoing summarizes the litigation variables.  It ranges from 0.05 in El Salvador to 
1.0 in New Zealand and Singapore.  Based on the index of ease of proving wrongdoing, litigation 
is significantly easier in common law countries than in civil law ones (index of 0.70 vs. 0.39). 
The index of ex-post private control of self-dealing encapsulates the disclosure 
requirements after the transaction is approved and the ease of proving wrongdoing.  It shows that 
disclosures requirements are more stringent and it is easier for plaintiffs to prove wrongdoing in 
court in common law countries than in civil legal origin ones (score of 0.74 vs. 0.43). 
Finally, we average the ex-ante and ex-post indices of private control of self-dealing and 
create an “anti-self-dealing” index.  The index is sharply higher in common law countries (0.66) 
than in civil law ones (0.35).  Consistent with this pattern, the anti-self-dealing index is lowest in 
Ecuador (0.08) and highest in Singapore (1.00).  
Interestingly, the regulation of self-dealing in the US and France depart in important 
ways from the patterns of their respective legal families.  The US does not require shareholder 
approval for related-party transactions and instead emphasizes litigation to protect minority 
shareholders against self-dealing.  France allows related party transactions to be carried out   19
without shareholder approval if they take place on “normal” terms.  However, it is easy to 
challenge related-party transactions that take place without shareholder approval.   
To be more specific, under Delaware law, the transaction may be approved by the board 
of directors.  In fact, James may even participate in the decision.  However, challenging the 
transaction in court is very easy if, as we assume,  interested directors participate in the decision. 
In view of the fact that  James controls both sides of the transaction, a shareholder would start off 
with a case in which Buyer’s board would have the difficult task of proving fair dealing and fair 
price (i.e., the “entire fairness” of the transaction).
7  Fair dealing covers such questions as when 
the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, 
and how the approval of the directors was obtained.  Fair price relates to the economic and 
financial considerations of the proposed transaction, including all relevant factors.  Directors 
must then show “entire fairness,” where all aspects of the issue are examined.  Here, unlike in the 
UK, the image of a “smell test” is a fitting metaphor for describing the work done by the judge in 
examining whether the transaction is entirely fair.   
In France, agreements between Buyer and, among others, 10% shareholders must first be 
approved by the board of directors and then by disinterested shareholders.  However, no special 
approval requirements are necessary for agreements “… entered into subject to normal 
conditions”.   In our empirical work, we assume that the transaction is approved by Buyer’s CEO 
as if its terms were “normal” (i.e. the transaction is approved in accordance with minimum legal 
requirements).  In practice, bypassing the approval requirements legally prescribed for 
transactions between Buyer and James may not be wise since such agreements may be cancelled 
                                                 
7 We assume that the transaction is approved in accordance with minimum legal requirements.  The Buyer’s board 
of directors could seek shareholder approval of the transaction.  Approval by either disinterested shareholders or a 
special committee of disinterested directors would shift the burden of the proof to the plaintiff, but the standard of 
review would remain entire fairness.  See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711-12 (Del. 1983). 
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if they have prejudicial consequences for the company.  In sum, the requirement to obtain 
shareholder approval for related party transactions is easy to avoid in France.  However, related-
party transactions are easy to challenge if they are not approved by shareholders.  In practice, 
shareholder approval is almost always sought.      
Turning to public enforcement, Table IV shows what happens when all approval and 
disclosure requirements are met, but James or the approving parties breach their duties to the 
company.  Those who approved the transaction are subject to fines in 46% of the sample 
countries.  In addition, on average, they may be imprisoned for about two years.  Interestingly, 
prison terms for those who approve the transaction are more severe in civil law countries than in 
common law ones.  Sanctions on James are even less severe than on the approving body and 
show no variation across legal origin.  Perhaps it is not surprising that James faces minimal 
criminal sanctions (1.9 years).  The more surprising result is that James is seldom subject to fines 
(36% of the sample).  The index of public enforcement summarizes our data on sanctions.   It 
shows no variation across legal origins.   
If James does not disclose his conflict of interest and his son the CEO carries out the 
transaction without Board or Shareholder approval, James can be convicted to 4.6 years in 
prison.  Criminal sanctions are prevalent (86% of the countries) when the transaction is carried 
out secretly.  There is no variation across legal origins in the severity of this sanction.    
One may wonder whether differences in the regulation of self-dealing can be explained 
by differences in income levels.  For example, rich countries may optimally choose to regulate 
self-dealing whereas poor countries may not be able to afford to do so.  The answer, however, is 
no.  The correlation between anti-self-dealing and (log) GDP per capita is a statistically 
insignificant 0.16 (see the appendix).     21
4. Regulation of Self-Dealing and Stock Market Development 
We are interested in linking the regulation of self-dealing to measures of the development 
of stock markets. We use five indicators of stock market development.  The first is the average 
ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP for the period 1999-2003.  In theory, public firms are 
larger, more valuable, and more plentiful in countries with better protection of shareholders 
(Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002).  The ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP encapsulates 
these predictions.  The second variable is the (median) premium paid for control in corporate 
control transactions for the period 1990-2000.  In several theoretical models, this variable has 
been interpreted as a measure of private benefits of control, which are higher in countries with 
weaker investor protection (Grossman and Hart 1988, Nenova 2003, Dyck and Zingales 2004). 
The third variable is the average number of domestic publicly-traded firms in each 
country relative to its population for the period 1999-2003.  The fourth is the average value of 
initial public offerings in each country relative to its GDP for the period 1996-2000.   Both of 
these variables should rise with investor protection (Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002).  The fifth 
and final variable is a proxy for ownership concentration among the largest firms in the country.  
Both theory (Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002) and prior evidence (La Porta et al. 1998, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1999, Claessens, Djankov, and Lang 2000, Faccio and Lang 
2002) show that ownership concentration is lower in countries with better investor protection.  
Consistent with our previous work, there are pronounced differences in financial 
development across legal families.  Compared to French civil law countries, common law 
countries have sharply more valuable stock markets relative to their GDPs (85.5% vs. 42.0%), a 
lower value of control (4% vs. 16%), more listed firms per million people (32.6 vs. 19.6,   
although statistically insignificant), more IPOs relative to their GDPs (3.7% vs. 1.7%), and less   22
concentrated ownership (44% vs. 55%).    Stock markets in German and Scandinavian law 
countries are also generally less developed than in common law countries but this pattern is less 
systematic than for French civil law countries.  In particular, German and Scandinavian law 
countries have ownership concentration and IPO activity comparable to those of common law 
countries.  In addition, the number of listed firms per million people is higher in Scandinavian 
legal origin countries than in common law countries (69.4 vs. 32.6).  In sum, for most indicators, 
stock markets are best developed in common law countries.  The development of stock markets 
in civil law, particularly French civil law, countries lags behind that of common law countries.  
  We first consider the effect on market capitalization and block premium of each of the six 
aspects of the regulation of self-dealing transactions: (1) approval by disinterested shareholders; 
(2) disclosure requirements before the transaction may be approved; (3) index of ex-ante private 
control of self-dealing; (4) disclosure requirements in periodic filings; (5) ease of proving 
wrongdoing; and (6) index of ex-post private control of self-dealing.  All specifications include 
logarithm of per capita income
8 and the efficiency of the judiciary as measured by the number of 
days to resolve a commercial dispute (Djankov et al. 2003a).   
To begin, Table V shows that the efficiency of the judiciary is associated with larger 
stock markets (Panel A) and a lower block premium (Panel B), while income per capita is 
associated with larger stock markets but not with a lower premium.  The key result in Panel A of 
Table V is that all six measures of the regulation of self-dealing are statistically and 
economically significant predictors of stock market development.   Figures II and III illustrate 
the relationship between stock market to GDP ratio and ex-ante and ex-post private control of 
self-dealing, respectively.  The estimated coefficients imply that a two-standard deviation 
increase in the indices of ex-ante and ex-post private control of self-dealing is associated with an 
                                                 
8 Results are qualitatively similar with the log of GDP per capita in constant purchasing power parity dollars.    23
increase in market to GDP ratio of 32 and 34 percentage points, respectively.  These effects are 
economically large: the sample average stock-market-capitalization-to-GDP ratio is 59%.   
In Figures II and III, Switzerland and Hong Kong are major outliers.  Switzerland plays a 
key role in making the results weaker than they would be otherwise.  Switzerland’s legal 
environment, from the perspective of disclosure, approval, and the burden of litigation is 
extremely friendly to insiders and hostile to outside shareholders.  Yet Switzerland has an 
extremely valuable stock market.  We might have missed some important legal protection of 
shareholders in Switzerland, or it might have developed mechanisms for protecting minority 
shareholders separate from the law.  Alternatively, the enormous investment resources of the 
Swiss banks might have artificially inflated the value of its stock market.
9 
The results on block premium are also interesting (Panel B of Table V).  Five measures 
of the regulation of self-dealing are robust predictors of lower block premium (the exception is 
difficulty in proving wrongdoing).   Consistent with the results on stock-market-to-GDP, the 
regulation of self-dealing has a large impact on private benefits.  Figures IV and V illustrate the 
results for the relationship between block premium and ex-ante and ex-post private control of 
self-dealing, respectively.  The estimated coefficients imply that increasing the ex-ante private 
control of self-dealing by two-standard deviations is associated with a reduction of 9% points in 
the median block premium -- a large effect since the block premium averages 11% in our 
sample.  Similarly, a two-standard deviation improvement in the ex-post index of private control 
of self-dealing is associated with an additional reduction of 10% in the median block premium.     
Table VI shows the effect of the indices of ex-ante private control of self-dealing (Panel 
A), ex-post private control of self-dealing (Panel B), and anti-self-dealing (Panel C) on our five 
                                                 
9 More generally, one might be concerned that the results are driven by extreme observations.  However, the results 
are qualitatively similar if we cap the stock market capitalization of four extreme observations on each side.  The 
results are also qualitatively similar when we run robust regressions.   24
indicators of the development of stock markets (Table VI also includes the results on stock 
market capitalization and block premium reported in Table V).   All three measures of the 
regulation of self-dealing are statistically significant for stock-market-capitalization-to-GDP, 
block premium, and IPOs-to-GDP.  In contrast, both the ex-post private control of self-dealing 
index and the overall anti-self-dealing index are significant for (log) firms per million 
inhabitants.  Finally, only the ex-post private control of self-dealing matters for ownership 
concentration.  Below we discuss the economic significance of these results.  
We have already noted that the effects of raising the ex ante and the ex post anti-self-
dealing indices on the stock market to GDP ratio and the block premium are economically large.  
The same is obviously true for the overall anti-self-dealing index.  Figure VI shows that the 
block premium is very high in Brazil and Mexico (49% and 47%, respectively), two countries for 
which the anti-self-dealing index is low (0.29 and 0.18, respectively).  Excluding both countries 
does not alter the statistical significance of the results.   
Both the ex-post control and the anti-self-dealing indices have a significant effect on the 
(logarithm of the) number of domestic firms per million inhabitants.  A two-standard deviation in 
the ex-post private control of self-dealing is associated with a 67% increase in the number of 
domestic firms.  Similarly, as illustrated by Figure VII, a two-standard deviation increase in the 
anti-self-dealing index is associated with a 51% increase in the number of domestic firms.     
All three indices of the regulation of self-dealing have a significant effect on the IPOs-to-
GDP ratio.  The estimated coefficient implies that increasing ex-ante private control of self-
dealing by two-standard deviations is associated with an increase in the IPOs-to-GDP ratio of 
1.7%.  This effect is very large since the sample mean of IPOs-to-GDP is only 3.0%.  Similarly, 
the estimated coefficient implies that increasing ex-post private control of self-dealing by two-  25
standard deviations is associated with an increase in the IPOs-to-GDP ratio of 1.8%. Finally, as 
illustrated by Figure VIII, the predicted effect of improving the anti-self-dealing index by two 
standard deviations is an additional 2.0% in the IPOs-to-GDP ratio.   
Ex-ante control of self-dealing does not lower ownership concentration (this result does 
not seem to be driven by a few outliers).  In contrast, increasing the ex-post self-dealing index by 
two standard deviations is associated with a reduction of 9% in ownership concentration.  To 
interpret this magnitude, note that the average ownership concentration in our sample is 47%. 
A skeptic may worry that our indices of the regulation of self-dealing data may depend 
on our method of aggregating the sub-indices.  One way to address this concern is to use 
principal components analysis to build indices of ex-ante and ex-post regulation of self-dealing 
as well as an aggregate anti-self-dealing index.  The results are qualitatively similar to those in 
Table VI.  Interestingly, the first principal component of anti-self-dealing is significant in the 
ownership concentration regression but the index itself is not.  These results should alleviate 
concerns about aggregation.      
Another concern with our findings on the effect of private enforcement rules on the 
development of stocks markets is endogeneity.  To address this concern, we can use legal origin, 
which is clearly exogenous, as an instrument.  However, as discussed by Glaeser et al. (2004), 
the use of instrumental variables in this context is problematic, since a valid instrument must not 
only be exogenous, but also uncorrelated with the error term.  Since legal origin influences other 
aspects of the legal environment which in turn affect financial development (including securities 
laws or other elements of corporate law), it might not be a valid instrument.  
There is no good solution to this problem, but we can show the results that do obtain. To 
begin, Table VII presents two-stage least square regressions using common law as an instrument   26
for the anti-self-dealing index.  Consistent with our OLS results in Table VI, the anti-self-dealing 
index is significant in the regressions for stock-market-capitalization-to-GDP, block premium, 
(logarithm of) firms per million inhabitants, and IPOs-to-GDPs (Panel A).  In addition, legal 
origin is a strong predictor of the regulation of self-dealing.  Note also that income per capita 
predicts the regulation of self-dealing when legal origin is included in the regressions but not in 
univariate regressions.    
To deal with the problem of the validity of the instrument, we have also replaced the anti-
self-dealing index with the first principal component of the four available measures of legal 
protection of shareholders: the anti-self-dealing index, the revised anti-director-rights index (see 
section 5), prospectus disclosure, and prospectus liability (the latter two variables come from La 
Porta et al. 2006).   The first principal component accounts for roughly 66% of the variation in 
these four variables.   In two-stage least squares results using common law as an instrument, the 
principal component is statistically significant for all proxies for stock market development 
except ownership concentration.  
Public enforcement is the last area of law we examine.  Table VIII shows that neither 
measure of public enforcement is associated with more developed stock markets.  Our proxy for 
public enforcement when all disclosure and approval requirements have been met is significant, 
but with the wrong sign, in only one regression (block premium).  Figure IX illustrates that there 
is no relationship between public enforcement and stock market capitalization and that this 
absence cannot be blamed on outliers.   Public enforcement is never significant when James does 
not disclose his conflict of interest.   
Advocates of public enforcement may dismiss these findings by arguing that what deters 
self-dealing is the likelihood that criminal sanctions are actually imposed (rather than their mere   27
existence).  Unfortunately, we lack data on actual enforcement practices to test this view.
   As a 
crude way of capturing the actual enforcement of fines and criminal sanctions, we run separate 
regressions for rich (above median GDP per capita) and poor countries (below median GDP per 
capita).  Public enforcement measured under the assumption that all disclosures and approval 
requirements have been met is never a significant predictor of stock market development.
10   
Ownership concentration in poor countries is the only measure of financial development that is 
predicted by our proxy for public enforcement when the transaction is approved without 
disclosure.  In sum, with the caveats that public enforcement may be measured with error and 
that it may matter in other situations, we find no evidence that public enforcement matters.   
Overall, the evidence shows that a high anti-self-dealing index is associated with valuable 
stock markets, more domestic firms, more initial public offerings, and lower benefits of control.  
In contrast, the anti-self-dealing index is not reliably associated with ownership concentration 
(although the index of ex-post control is).  Finally, public enforcement does not predict more 
developed stock markets.   One reason to be cautious about the large estimated effect of the 
regulation of self-dealing on financial development is that this regulation may covary with other 
legal and non-legal institutions.   We examine this issue in the next two sections. 
 
5.  Other Measures of Investor Protection. 
In previous work, we have constructed three other measures of investor protection: anti-
director rights, disclosure in the prospectus, and prospectus liability.  In this section, we examine 
                                                 
10 We have also examined the explanatory power of our proxies for public enforcement in the sub-sample of 24 
countries that first enforced insider trading laws before 1996 (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002).  In this sub-sample, 
we find that public enforcement when the transaction is carried out without disclosure is associated with less 
ownership concentration.  In contrast, public enforcement when the transaction complies with disclosure and 
approval requirements is associated with more ownership concentration and a higher block premium.  
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the robustness of our findings on the effect of anti-self-dealing on the development of stock 
markets when including these three alternative measures of investor protection.  In particular, we 
are interested in understanding whether the theoretically-grounded anti-self-dealing index works 
better than the original index of anti-director rights in explaining financial development.  
  We begin with the anti-director index.  The original anti-director rights index, reported in 
La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), is available for 49 countries and is based on laws in force circa 
1993.   This index has been criticized by a number of scholars for its ad-hoc nature, for mistakes 
in its coding, and most recently for conceptual ambiguity in the definitions of some of its 
components (Pagano and Volpin 2005, Spamann 2005).  Our first step is then to describe and 
present a revised index of anti-director rights for 72 countries based on laws and regulations 
applicable to publicly-traded firms in May 2003.  The revised index relies on the same basic 
dimensions of corporate law, but defines them with more precision.  
Both the original and the revised anti-director rights indices summarize the protection of 
minority shareholders in the corporate decision-making process, including the right to vote.  The 
index covers the following six areas:  (1) vote by mail; (2) obstacles to the actual exercise of the 
right to vote (i.e., the requirement that shares be deposited before the shareholders’ meeting); (3) 
minority representation on the Board of Directors through cumulative voting or proportional 
representation; (4) an oppressed minority mechanism to seek redress in case of expropriation; (5) 
pre-emptive rights to subscribe to new securities issued by the company; and (6) right to call a 
special shareholder meeting.  The general principle behind the construction of the revised anti-
director rights index is to associate better investor protection with laws that explicitly mandate, 
or set as a default rule, provisions that are favorable to minority shareholders.  We recognize that 
firms may, in their charters, opt out of the default rules set in the law.  Firms may also enhance   29
investor protection by including in their charters provisions favorable to shareholders.  However, 
it has been shown theoretically (Bergman and Nicolaievsky 2007) and established empirically – 
including in this paper – that the actual rules do matter for financial development.  
Methodologically, the key difference between the original and revised indices of anti-
director rights lies in the treatment of enabling provisions.  To illustrate, consider the example of 
cumulative voting in the US.  The Delaware code contains a provision that explicitly allows the 
certificate of incorporation of any corporation to provide that directors be elected through 
cumulative voting.  In our earlier work, we did not draw a distinction between enabling 
provisions and mandatory and default rules (Spamann 2005), so our original index of anti-
director rights treats the US as having cumulative voting.  Arguably, an enabling provision may 
lower the cost of private contracting.  However, we ignore enabling provisions when coding the 
revised anti-director rights index and now treat the US as not having cumulative voting.  We do 
so because enabling provisions are more prevalent in common than in civil law countries and we 
want to bias the results against the hypothesis that common law better protects investors. 
The revised anti-director rights index is based on six proxies defined on Table IX.  First, 
to make voting easier, shareholders may appoint a proxy to take their place at the shareholders’ 
meeting and vote on their behalf.  In many countries, the solicitation of proxies is unregulated 
and shareholders lack sufficient information to provide specific instructions to the proxy on how 
to vote on the items on the agenda.  In other countries, in contrast, shareholders may vote by mail 
on each of the items on the agenda through a ballot or proxy form.  The regulation of the proxy 
solicitation process makes it easier for shareholders to both cast informed votes and oppose 
proposals put forward by directors.  Thus our first sub-index reflects the difficulty of making 
informed votes by mail.     30
Second, in some countries, the law requires, or permits companies to require, that 
shareholders who intend to vote at the shareholders’ meeting deposit their shares with the 
company or a financial intermediary.  The requirement that shares be deposited is closely related 
to the existence of bearer shares and is intended to force shareholders to prove their right to vote.   
This requirement imposes a cost on shareholders as they must obtain a certificate proving their 
ownership or are unable to sell their shares (i.e., shares are “blocked”) or both.  Moreover, when 
the identity of shareholders is unknown, dissenting shareholders face great difficulties forming 
coalitions with like-minded shareholders before the meeting.   
Third, some countries mandate or set as a default rule that shareholders cast all their votes 
for one candidate for the board of directors or supervisory board (cumulative voting) or provide a 
mechanism of proportional representation in the board of directors or supervisory board.  The 
effect of cumulative voting and proportional representation is to limit the power of controlling 
shareholders to dominate the board of directors or supervisory board. 
Fourth, some countries provide legal mechanisms that protect minority shareholders 
against oppressive actions by controlling shareholders.  These mechanisms include the right to 
rescind transactions that are prejudicial to the company or to recover damages suffered by the 
company in case of prejudicial resolutions of the shareholders’ meeting, or decisions of the board 
of directors, or both.  In contrast, in other countries transactions may only be rescinded in case of 
fraud and shareholders may only seek to recover damages suffered by the company if they can 
prove that directors acted with negligence, gross negligence, bad faith, or fraud.
11  
Fifth, in some countries shareholders have a preemptive right to buy new issues of stock, 
which can only be waived by a shareholder vote.  In the absence of preemptive rights, insiders 
                                                 
11 This fourth component of the anti-directors index is closely related to the sub-index of ease of proving 
wrongdoing in the anti-self-dealing index.     31
may expropriate minority shareholders by offering shares to related parties, or even to 
themselves, at below-market prices.   
Finally, we consider the minimum fraction of capital or votes that entitles a shareholder 
to call a shareholders' meeting.  Shareholders owning at least 3% of the capital are entitled to call 
a meeting in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.  In contrast, shareholders must own at least 20% of the 
capital to call a meeting in Belgium, Venezuela, and Uruguay.  Shareholders in firms 
incorporated in Delaware may not call an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting at all unless 
authorized by the certificate of incorporation or bylaws.  Insiders have greater control over the 
firm where it is more difficult for minority shareholders to call a shareholders’ meeting. 
The correlation between the revised anti-director rights index and one presented by La 
Porta et al. (1997, 1998) is 0.60.  As in the case of the original index, differences between 
English and French legal origin countries are extremely pronounced and we discuss them first.  
English legal origin countries are more likely than French legal origin ones to provide voting by 
mail (76% vs. 22%), avoid the requirement that shares be deposited (100% vs. 50%), and 
provide an oppression remedy (90% vs. 28%).  Moreover, English legal origin countries require 
less capital to call a shareholders meeting than do French legal origin ones (9% vs. 11%).  In 
contrast, French legal origin countries are more likely than English legal origin ones to require 
cumulative voting (34% vs. 10%) and to offer shareholders preemptive rights (91% vs. 52%).  
The index of anti-director rights aggregates the information contained in these six proxies for 
investor protection.  Consistent with our earlier findings, the index of anti-director rights is 
sharply higher in English legal origin countries than in French legal origin ones (4.19 vs. 2.91).   
Also consistent with our earlier work, there are several differences among civil law 
families.  Specifically, Scandinavian legal origin countries are more likely than French and   32
German legal origin ones to avoid the requirement that shares be deposited ahead of a 
shareholders’ meeting (100% for Scandinavian countries vs. 50% and 43% for French and 
German countries, respectively) as well as to provide an oppressed minority mechanism (60% 
for Scandinavian countries vs. 28% and 32% for French and German countries, respectively).  
Capital requirements to call a shareholder’s meeting in Scandinavian and German legal origin 
countries (9% and 6%, respectively) are lower than in French (11%) legal origin countries and 
comparable to those in English legal origin ones (9%).  As a result of these differences among 
civil law families, the index of anti-director rights is lowest in French legal origin countries 
(2.91) and highest in Scandinavian ones (3.80).  In fact, the anti-director index in Scandinavian 
legal origin countries (3.80) is not statistically different than in English legal origin ones (4.29).
12   
Table X shows the relationship between our five proxies for the development of stock 
markets and both the original anti-directors variable (Panel A) and the revised one (Panel B).   
The original anti-director rights index is associated with a higher stock-market-capitalization-to-
GDP ratio, a smaller block premium, more domestic firms and IPOs-to-GDP, and less ownership 
concentration.  The revised one, however, is insignificant in the regressions for block premium.  
The revised index has a large effect on the development of stock markets.  For example, a two-
standard deviations increase in the anti-director index is associated with an increase in stock-
market-capitalization-to-GDP of 23 percentage points (sample mean of 59%), a 92% increase in 
the number of domestic firms per million inhabitants, an increase of 1.5 percentage points in the 
IPOs-to-GDP ratio (sample mean of 3%), and a reduction of 7 percentage points in ownership 
concentration (sample mean of 47%).  
                                                 
12 Scandinavian countries have significantly higher income per capita than the rest of the sample ($29,374 vs. 
$9,295).  This raises the question of whether the strength of investor protection in Scandinavian countries may 
simply reflect the fact that they are rich.  However, the index of anti-director rights is uncorrelated (0.0718) with 
(log) GDP per capita (see the correlation table in the appendix).   33
Table XI presents horse races between the anti-self-dealing index, (revised) anti-director 
rights (Panel A), and the two variables from the La Porta et al. (2006) study of securities laws: 
prospectus disclosure (Panel B), and prospectus liability (Panel C).  Before presenting the horse-
race results, note that the correlations of anti-self-dealing with anti-director rights, disclosure 
requirements, and prospectus  liability are 0.55, 0.67 and 0.42, respectively (see correlation table 
in the appendix).  This suggests that it is going to be difficult to disentangle the effects of the 
anti-self-dealing index and the disclosure in the prospectus, which is not surprising in light of the 
fact that both measures heavily focus on disclosure (albeit in different spheres).   
When controlling for anti-director rights (see Panel A), the anti-self-dealing index loses 
significance for firms per capita and IPOs to GDP ratio but remains significant for our two 
preferred measures of stock market development: stock-market-capitalization-to-GDP and block 
premium.  In the same regressions (i.e., controlling for the anti-self-dealing index), the anti-
director rights index loses significance for stock-market-capitalization-to-GDP, IPOs-to-GDP, 
and ownership concentration and remains significant only for (log) firms per capita.  We 
conclude that the anti-self-dealing index is a more robust predictor of the development of stock 
markets than the anti-director rights index.    
Controlling for disclosure in the prospectus (Panel B), the anti-self-dealing index is never 
significant.  Disclosure in the prospectus, however, is significant in all regressions.  Controlling 
for prospectus liability (Panel C), the anti-self-dealing index remains significant for block 
premium, (log) firms per population, and IPOs-to-GDP and loses significance for market-
capitalization-to-GDP. Prospectus liability is significant in all regressions.  The anti-self-dealing 
index, disclosure in the prospectus, and prospectus liability all matter for the development of 
stock markets, but the former is a less robust predictor than the latter two.   34
6.  Robustness  
Our main finding is that the regulation of self-dealing varies across legal origins and is 
associated with more developed securities markets.   In this section, we address alternative 
interpretations of these findings.  
To begin, effective tax enforcement can prevent some self-dealing transactions.  Our 
indices of the regulation of self-dealing may be picking up this effect (Dyck and Zingales 2004; 
Desai, Dyck, and Zingales 2006).  To test this hypothesis, we include a subjective measure of the 
incidence of tax evasion in our specifications.  The results on Panel A of Table XII show that tax 
evasion is significant for stock market capitalization and (logarithm) domestic firms per capita.  
In contrast, anti-self-dealing is significant only for block premium and nearly significant for 
IPOs-to-GDP (at the 10.7% level).   Tax evasion and anti-self-dealing knock each other out.   
One difficulty in interpreting these results is that tax evasion is a subjective variable 
highly correlated with perceptions (from the 1999 Global Competitiveness Report) of the quality 
of corporate governance as proxied by the perceived incidence of insider trading (correlation of 
0.67) or the perceived quality of financial disclosure (correlation 0.61).  To examine whether low 
tax evasion is capturing effective corporate governance, we pursue two further robustness 
checks.  First, we investigate the robustness of the results on tax enforcement.  Specifically, we 
collect data on three alternative, and arguably more objective, measures of tax evasion:  the size 
of the informal economy, cross-border bank deposits of non-banks by residence of depositor, and 
assets held by Swiss banks by residence of beneficial owner.
13   Controlling for the anti-self-
dealing index, cross-border deposits by non-banks enters significantly in the ownership 
                                                 
13 The size of the informal economy is from Djankov et al. (2002).  Cross-border deposits by non-banks is from 
“International Financial Statistics” (October 1997; variable 7xrd).  Assets held by Swiss banks in 2003 as fiduciaries 
for foreign investors are from “Banks in Switzerland 2005” published by the Swiss National Bank.  We scale the last 
two variables by GDP.   35
concentration regression.  However, the estimated coefficients for the three tax evasion proxies 
are insignificant in the other fourteen regressions. 
  Second, we include disclosure in the prospectus along with tax evasion in our 
regressions for the size of securities markets.  Controlling for disclosure in the prospectus, tax 
evasion remains significant both for stock market capitalization and (logarithm) domestic firms 
per capita (see Panel C).  Disclosure in the prospectus is significant in all five regressions.     
Taken together, these results do not support the view that omitted tax evasion accounts for the 
strength of anti-self-dealing in explaining the development of securities markets.   
Public opinion pressure through the media may also curb private benefits (Dyck and 
Zingales 2004; Desai, Dyck, and Zingales 2007).   This raises a concern that the benefits of 
disclosure as reflected in our indices come from the effects of the open media working as a 
watchdog.  To address this concern, we include in our regressions a measure of per capita 
newspaper circulation, as suggested by Dyck and Zingales (2004).   Newspaper circulation does 
affect the (logarithm) number of domestic firms per capita, but it has no effect on other measures 
of stock market development (Panel C).   In contrast, the regulation of self-dealing remains 
significant in all four regressions.   These results do not mean that the media is unimportant for 
corporate governance, but they help put to rest omitted variable concerns. 
Finally, investor protection may be determined by politics rather than legal origin.     
Pagano and Volpin’s (2005) model predicts that proportional electoral systems are conducive to 
weaker investor protection than majoritarian systems
14.   Table XIII addresses this hypothesis.  
Panel A shows univariate regressions using common law and proportional representation to 
explain anti-self-dealing regulation.  Consistent with the results on Table III, common law 
countries have sharply higher anti-self-dealing scores.  Moreover, as predicted by Pagano and 
                                                 
14 See also Perotti and von Thadden (2006), Roe (2000), and Rajan and Zingales (2003).     36
Volpin (2005), proportional representation is associated with lower anti-self-dealing scores.   
When both proportional representation and common law are included in the regression, only the 
latter is statistically significant.    
Multicollinearity makes it difficult to disentangle the effect of proportional representation 
and common law: the correlation between the two variables is -.46.  To get around this problem, 
we run univariate regressions for common and civil law countries separately using proportional 
representation to explain anti-self-dealing regulation (Panel B).   Proportional representation is 
insignificant in both regressions even though, as illustrated by Figure X, it varies considerably 
within civil law countries.   As a final check of whether legal origin is a proxy for politics, we 
split the sample into countries above and below the median competitiveness of the legislature 
(Panel C).  If common law is a proxy for electoral rules, it should not predict the development of 
securities markets in non-democratic countries.  Instead, we find that common law is a 
significant predictor of the anti-self-dealing index in both sub-samples.   Figure XI illustrates this 
result.  These findings should allay fears that legal origin is a proxy for politics.    
In summary, the quality of investor protection, as measured by anti-self-dealing or 
disclosure in the prospectus, is not merely a proxy for non-legal institutions and politics.   Law 
indeed does seem to matter for finance.  Our results do not mean that non-legal institutions and 
politics are unimportant for the development of stock markets; only that legal rules are not mere 
proxies for these institutions.   
 
7. Summary and Implications. 
  We have constructed a new index of shareholder protection for 72 countries.  The index 
addresses specifically the protection of minority shareholders against self-dealing transactions   37
benefiting controlling shareholders.  As such, it is better grounded in theory than the index of 
anti-director rights constructed by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) and revised for this paper.  We 
have found that the anti-self-dealing index exhibits some of the same properties as both the anti-
director rights index, and the indices of shareholder protection through securities laws presented 
in La Porta et al. (2006).  Specifically, the index is sharply higher in common law countries than 
in French civil law countries.  The index is also a statistically significant and economically 
strong predictor of a variety of measures of stock market development across countries.  These 
results support the findings of the earlier work, but also show that theoretically-grounded 
measures of investor protection are closely tied to financial development.  In conclusion, we  
delineate the implications of these findings in three areas: the measurement of shareholder 
protection, the interpretation of legal origin, and the design of regulatory strategies. 
   
Implications for the Measurement of Shareholder Protection 
  The availability of four measures of shareholder protection, each collected with a 
different methodology and addressing a different situation, raises an obvious question: what is 
“the best” measure for researchers to use?   The measures of shareholder protection from 
securities laws appear to “work” best in terms of predicting stock market outcomes, but they are 
only available for 49 countries.  These measures are particularly appropriate for studies of 
protection of investors buying securities, as opposed to corporate governance per se.  The revised 
anti-director rights index and the anti-self-dealing index are available for 72 countries.  The 
former has the advantage of continuity with previous studies; the latter is clearer conceptually, as 
pertains directly to the pervasive problem of corporate self-dealing (or tunneling).  Indeed, this 
last benefit seems to us to be dispositive.  To the extent that self-dealing is the central problem of   38
corporate governance in most countries, the law’s effectiveness in regulating this problem is the 
fundamental element of shareholder protection.   This suggests to us that, in general, the anti-
self-dealing index is preferred to the anti-director-rights index in cross-country empirical work.   
 
Implications for the Interpretation of Legal Origin   
  For all the measures of shareholder protection we have considered, there is a pronounced 
difference between common and French civil law countries.  This does not mean that politics, 
media, or for that matter culture do not affect legal rules – they surely do.  But the evidence 
shows quite clearly that legal origins are not merely proxies for politics or media; they exert 
large and powerful influences on legal rules.  Moreover, our examination of specific legal rules 
permits some further insight into what explains these differences among legal origins. 
  Johnson et al. (2000b) conjecture that common law is more suspicious of conflicted 
transactions than civil law, and subjects them to closer regulatory and legal scrutiny.  The results 
of this paper are broadly consistent with that conjecture.  Specifically, common law countries 
subject related-party transactions to greater disclosure requirements as well as to more arms-
length approval, than do French civil law countries in particular.  These different approaches to 
the regulation of self-dealing appear to derive from long-standing legal principles, such as 
fiduciary duty, which over time are incorporated into the statutes that we actually observe.  
  Compared to our previous research, we still find greater emphasis on ex post litigation in 
common law than in civil law countries, although it appears that ex post – once the disclosure 
and the approval requirements are met – it is quite difficult for shareholders to recover damages 
even in common law countries.  The US seems to be exceptional, with its greater emphasis on ex   39
post litigation rather than ex ante disclosure and approval.  The ex ante transparency in self-
dealing transactions appears to be the central difference between common and civil law. 
  At a broader level, the results are consistent with the view of Djankov et al. (2003b) that 
common law is distinguished from civil law by its encouragement of private solutions to the 
problem of “disorder.”   In a common law system, statutes seek to reduce the costs of these 
private solutions, but not to replace them with public ones.  Mandatory disclosure and arms-
length approval are very clear examples of this broader strategy of social control of business 
associated with common law. 
  
Implications for Regulatory Strategies   
If we take the evidence in this paper at face value, several ideas for the improvement of 
regulation of corporate governance, particularly in the area of self-dealing transactions, emerge.  
Perhaps the most basic conclusion from the data is that laissez-faire – the strategy of no public 
involvement at all – does not lead to developed financial markets.  The public sector clearly has a 
central role to play, but principally as the designer of the rules of the game, which are then 
enforced by private action.  Specifically, our findings reinforce those in La Porta et al. (2006) on 
securities laws, who also identify the key role of private contracting and enforcement for 
financial development, and deemphasize that of public enforcers.  Countries with successful 
stock markets mandate that shareholders receive the information they need and the power to act 
– including both voting and litigation – on this information.  There is no evidence that these 
countries rely heavily on fines and criminal sanctions.  This, perhaps, is the crucial message.  But 
there are specific conclusions as well.     40
First, the results suggest that an effective strategy of regulating large self-dealing 
transactions is to combine full public disclosure of such transactions (including the potential 
conflicts) with the requirement of approval by disinterested shareholders.  In practical 
implementation, this policy must take account of the fact that, in many countries, firms are 
organized in business groups with individual firms controlled by the same family while trading 
separately on the stock exchange, so that many intra-group transactions are potentially 
conflicted.  To avoid shareholder involvement in daily activities of such groups, the law needs to 
set lower bounds on which intra-group transactions must be disclosed and brought to 
shareholders for approval.  However, we do not believe that group structures invalidate the 
wisdom of disclosure and shareholder approval altogether.  Indeed, financial structures in which 
group member firms are listed separately only encourage self-dealing, and legal rules that expose 
intra-group transaction to both public light and shareholder approval may be desirable even if – 
and perhaps because -- they render such financial structures impractical.    
We stress that this approach to regulating self-dealing is compatible with any legal 
system, and is appropriate for not just rich, but also middle income countries.  Sunshine indeed 
seems to be the best disinfectant.  We also note that the benefits of full disclosure for stock 
market development were also extremely large in our study of securities laws (La Porta et al. 
2006), where we focused on disclosure by firms issuing securities to the public. 
Second, the evidence suggests that on-going disclosure of self-dealing transactions, 
combined with the relatively easy burden of litigation placed on the aggrieved shareholders, also 
benefits stock market development.  Here reforms may be more difficult, as their success would 
depend on the more general structure and efficiency of legal systems in different countries.   
Nonetheless, the results suggest that giving aggrieved shareholders the standing to sue, access to   41
information to identify self-dealing, and a low burden of proof would deter self-dealing and 
promote stock market development.  
Finally, the evidence suggests that the government’s power to impose fines and prison 
terms for self-dealing transactions does not benefit stock market development.  We stress that 
this is a narrow conclusion, since we lack data on the actual enforcement of criminal sanctions 
and cannot rule out that public enforcement may matter under alternative scenarios.  To avoid 
self-dealing, however, it appears best to rely on extensive disclosure, approval by disinterested 
shareholders and private enforcement.   42
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 Table I 
Description of the Variables 
This table describes the variables collected for the 72 countries in our study.  Unless otherwise 
noted, the source of the variables is the questionnaire sent to Lex-Mundi firms. 
 
Variable Description 
1.1) Private Enforcement: Ex-Ante Private Control of Self-Dealing 
Approval by disinterested 
Shareholders 
Equals 1 if the transaction must be approved by disinterested shareholders, and 
zero otherwise. 
 
Disclosures by Buyer  Index of disclosures that are required before the transaction may be approved.  
Ranges from 0 to 1. One-third point if each of the following items must be 
disclosed by Buyer to the public or its shareholders before the transaction is 
approved:  (1) Mr. James owns 60% of Buyer; (2) Mr. James owns 90% of 
Seller; and either (3) all material facts or the following three items: (a) 
description of the assets; (b) nature and amount of consideration; and (c) 
explanation for the price. 
 
Disclosures by Mr. James   Index of disclosures that Mr. James must make before the transaction may be 
approved.  Ranges from 0 to 1. Equals 0 if no disclosure is required. Equals 
1/2 if only the existence of a conflict of interest must be disclosed, without 
details.  Equals 1 if all material facts must be disclosed. 
 
Independent review  Equals 1 if a positive review required before the transaction may be approved 
(e.g., by a financial expert or independent auditor), and zero otherwise. 
 
Ex-ante disclosure  Average of the preceding three variables. 
 
Ex-ante private control of self-
dealing 
Index of ex-ante control of self-dealing transactions. Average of approval by 
disinterested shareholders and ex-ante disclosure. 
 
Principal component – Ex-ante  First principal component of: (1) approval by disinterested shareholders; (2) 
disclosures by buyer; (3) disclosures by Mr. James; and (4) independent 
review. 
 
1.2) Private Enforcement: Ex-Post Private Control of Self-Dealing 
Disclosure in periodic filings   Index  of  disclosures  required in periodic disclosures (e.g., annual reports).   
Ranges from 0 to 1.  One fifth-point for each of the following items:  (1) Mr. 
James owns 60% of stake in Buyer; (2) Mr. James owns 90% of Seller; (3) 
shares held beneficially by Mr. James  (i.e., shares held and/or managed via a 
nominee account, trust, brokerage firm or bank); (4)  shares held indirectly by 
Mr. James  (e.g., via a subsidiary company or holding); and either (5) all 
material facts about the transaction or the following three items: (a) 
description of the assets; (b) nature and amount of consideration; and (c) 
explanation for the price. 
 
Standing  to  sue  Equals 1 if a 10% shareholder may sue derivatively Mr. James or the 
approving bodies or both for damages that the firm suffered as a result of the 
transaction, and zero otherwise. 
 
Rescission  Index of the ease in rescinding the transaction.   Ranges from 0 to 1.  Equals 0 Variable Description 
when rescission is unavailable or only available in case of bad faith, or when 
the transaction is unreasonable or causes disproportionate damage.  Equals 1/2 
when rescission is available when the transaction is oppressive or prejudicial.  
Equals 1 when rescission is available when the transaction is unfair or entails a 
conflict of interest. 
 
Ease of holding Mr. James  liable  Index of the ease in holding Mr. James liable for civil damages.  Ranges from 
0 to 1.  Equals 0 when the interested director is either not liable or liable in 
case of bad faith, intent, or gross negligence.  Equals 1/2 when the interested 
director is liable if he either influenced the approval or was negligent.  Equals 
1 if the interested director is liable if the transaction is unfair, oppressive, or 
prejudicial. 
 
Ease of holding the approving 
body liable 
Index of the ease in holding members of the approving body liable for civil 
damages.  Ranges from 0 to 1.  Equals 0 when members of the approving body 
are either not liable or liable in case of intent, bad faith, or gross negligence.  
Equals 1/2 when members of the approving body are liable if they acted 
negligently.  Equals 1 if members of the approving body are liable if the 
transaction is unfair, oppressive, or prejudicial. 
 
Access to evidence  Index of access to evidence.  Ranges from 0 to 1. One quarter point for each of 
the following four rights:  (1) a shareholder owning at least 10% of the shares 
can request that the Court appoint an inspector to investigate Buyer’s affairs; 
(2) the plaintiff can request any documents relevant to the case from the 
defendant (without specifying which ones); (3) the plaintiff may examine the 
defendant without the Court approving the questions in advance; and (4) the 
plaintiff may examine non-parties without the court approving the questions in 
advance.  One-eight point for each of the following two rights:  (1) the 
plaintiff may examine the defendant but questions require prior court approval; 
and (2) the plaintiff may examine directly the non-parties but questions require 
prior court approval. 
 
Ease in proving wrongdoing  Average of the preceding five variables. 
 
Ex-post private control of self-
dealing 
Index of ex-post control over self-dealing transactions.  Average of disclosure 
in periodic filings and ease of proving wrongdoing. Ranges from zero to one. 
 
Principal component – Ex-post  First principal component of : (1) each of the elements in the index of 
disclosure in periodic filings; (2) standing to sue; (3) rescission; ease of 
holding Mr. James liable; (4) ease of holding the approving body liable; and 
(5) access to evidence.   
 
1.3) Private Enforcement: Anti-self-dealing index 
Anti-self-dealing index  Average of ex-ante and ex-post private control of self-dealing. 
 
Principal component -- All  First principal component of : : (1) approval by disinterested shareholders; (2) 
disclosures by buyer; (3) disclosures by Mr. James; (4) independent review; 
(5) each of the elements in the index of disclosure in periodic filings; (6) 
standing to sue; (7) rescission; ease of holding Mr. James liable; (8) ease of 
holding the approving body liable; and (9) access to evidence.   
 
2) Public Enforcement Variable Description 
Fines for the approving body  Equals one if fines may be applied to the approving body when all disclosure 
and approval requirements have been met, and zero otherwise. 
 
Prison term for approving body  Maximum length of prison term for members of the approving body if all 
disclosure and approval requirements have been met.  
 
Fines  for  Mr.  James    Equals one if fines may be applied to Mr. James when all disclosure and 
approval requirements have been met, and zero otherwise. 
 
Prison term for Mr. James   Maximum length of prison term for Mr. James if all disclosure and approval 
requirements have been met. 
 
Public enforcement index  Index of public enforcement if all disclosure and approval requirements have 
been met.  Ranges from 0 to 1. One quarter point when each of the following 
sanctions is available:  (1) fines for the approving body; (2) jail sentences for 
the approving body; (3) fines for Mr. James; and (4) jail sentence for Mr. 
James.  
 
Prison term for Mr. James if he 
does not disclose 
Maximum length of prison term for Mr. James if Junior completes the 
transaction without seeking approval by the Board of Directors or the 
Shareholders’ Meeting.  Moreover, neither Junior nor Mr. James discloses the 
conflict of interest.    
3) Stock Market Development 
Stock market capitalization to 
GDP 
Average of the ratio of stock market capitalization to gross domestic product 
for the period 1999-2003. Source: World Development Indicators at 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/. 
 
Block premium  “The block premia is computed taking the difference between the price per 
share paid for the control block and the exchange price two days after the 
announcement of the control transaction, dividing by the exchange price and 
multiplying by the ratio of the proportion of cash flow rights represented in the 
controlling block.”  We use the country’s sample media. Source: Dyck and 
Zingales (2004). 
 
Listed firms per million 
population 
Average ratio of the number of domestic firms listed in a given country to its 
population (in millions) for the period 1999-2003. Source:  World 
Development Indicators at http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/. 
 
IPOs-to-GDP  The average ratio of the equity issued by newly listed firms in a given country 
(in thousands) to its GDP (in millions) over the period 1996-2000. Source:  La 
Porta et al. (2006). 
 
Ownership concentration  Average percentage of common shares owned by the top three shareholders in 
the ten largest non-financial, privately-owned domestic firms in a given 
country. A firm is considered privately-owned if the State is not a known 
shareholder in it. Source: Source:  La Porta et al. (2006). 
 
4) Control Variables 
Ln GDP/POP  Logarithmic of per capita Gross Domestic Product (in US dollars) in 2003.  
Source:  World Development Indicators at 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/. 
 Variable Description 
Time to collect on a bounced 
check 
Logarithm of the length (in calendar days) of the judicial procedure to collect 
on a bounced check.  Source:  Djankov  et al. (2003a). 
 
Common  law  Equals one if the origin of the commercial law of a country is English 
Common Law, and zero otherwise.  Source:  La Porta et al. (1999). 
 
Disclosure in the prospectus  Index of the scope of disclosure in the prospectus of an IPO.  Source:  La 
Porta et al. (2006). 
 
Prospectus liability  Index of the procedural difficulty in recovering losses in a civil liability case 
for losses due to misleading statements in the prospectus.  Source:  La Porta et 
al. (2006). 
 
Tax evasion  Assessment of the prevalence of tax evasion. Higher scores indicate higher tax 
evasion.  The data is for 2002.  Ranges from 0.94 to 8.54.  Source:  World 
Economic Forum (2003).  
 
Newspaper  circulation  Logarithmic of newspapers and periodicals circulation per thousand 
inhabitants in 2000 (or closest available).  Source:  United Nations Statistical 
Database (http://unstats.un.org). 
 
Proportional representation  Equals 3 if 100 percent of seats are assigned via a proportional rule, 2 if the 
majority of seats are assigned by this rule, 1 if a minority of seats is assigned 
proportionally, and 0 if no seats are assigned in this way. The data are drawn 
from the 3/2002 World Bank Database on Political Institutions and defined in 
Beck et al. (2001).  We use all available observations for the period 1975-
2000. 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Country
Approval by disinterested 
shareholders
Disclosure by Buyer Disclosure by James Independent review Ex-ante disclosure
Ex-ante private control of self-
dealing
(Average (2)-(4)) (Average (1) and (5))
Average common law 0.48 0.62 0.95 0.48 0.68 0.58
Average French origin 0.19 0.30 0.63 0.19 0.37 0.28
Average German origin 0.14 0.38 0.43 0.36 0.39 0.27
Average Scandinavian origin 0.00 0.73 0.40 0.20 0.44 0.22
Average Civil Law 0.16 0.37 0.55 0.24 0.38 0.27
Common vs. Civil 2.98
a 2.28
b 4.73
a 2.05
b 4.23
a 4.00
a
French vs Common 2.31
b 2.68
a 3.74
a 2.31
b 4.05
a 3.42
a
French vs German 0.36 0.62 1.60 1.23 0.20 0.15
French vs Scandinavian 1.04 2.36
b 1.28 0.06 0.59 0.46
a Significant at 1% level.
b Significant at 5% level.
c Significant at 10% level.
Table II
Ex-ante control of self-dealing
T-Stat
This table presents data on measures of the ex-ante regulation of self-dealing transactions for 72 countries classified by their legal origin.   Definitions for each of the variables are given in Table I.  This table also reports tests of means by legal origin. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Country
Disclosure in 
periodic filings
Standing to sue Rescission
Ease of holding Mr. 
James liable
Ease of holding 
approving body liable
Access to 
evidence
Ease of proving 
wrongdoing
Ex-post private control 
of self-dealing
Anti-self-dealing index
(Average (2)-(6)) (Average (1) and (7))
Average common law 0.78 0.90 0.52 0.62 0.74 0.75 0.70 0.74 0.66
Average French origin 0.42 0.56 0.08 0.30 0.34 0.43 0.34 0.38 0.33
Average German origin 0.56 0.86 0.00 0.39 0.46 0.51 0.44 0.50 0.38
Average Scandinavian origin 0.56 0.80 0.00 0.60 0.50 0.80 0.54 0.55 0.39
Average Civil law 0.47 0.67 0.05 0.35 0.39 0.49 0.39 0.43 0.35
World average 0.56 0.74 0.19 0.43 0.49 0.56 0.48 0.52 0.44
Common vs Civil 3.89
a 2.12
b 6.95
a 3.02
a 4.35
a 4.26
a 6.40
a 6.05
a 6.29
a
French vs Common 4.13
a 2.80
a 5.18
a 3.24
a 4.26
a 5.58
a 6.72
a 6.26
a 5.86
a
French vs German 1.37 1.97
c 1.13 1.06 1.59 1.12 2.09
b 1.98
b 0.98
French vs Scandinavian 0.89 0.99 0.67 2.30
b 1.47 4.15
a 2.77
a 1.73
c 0.73
a Significant at 1% level.
b Significant at 5% level.
c Significant at 10% level.
Table III
Ex-post private control of self-dealing and anti-self-dealing index
This table presents data on measures of the ex-post regulation of self-dealing transactions for 72 countries classified by their legal origin.   Definitions for each of the variables are given in Table I.  This table also reports tests 
of means by legal origin. 
T-StatApplicable fines Prison term Applicable fines Prison term
Average common law 0.43 1.14 0.33 1.43 0.32 5.74
Average French origin 0.44 2.39 0.34 1.98 0.42 3.98
Average German origin 0.50 3.36 0.36 2.64 0.48 5.07
Average Scandinavian origin 0.60 2.40 0.60 0.80 0.55 2.80
Average civil law 0.47 2.66 0.37 2.05 0.45 4.17
World average 0.46 2.22 0.36 1.87 0.41 4.63
Common vs Civil 0.32 1.94
c 0.31 0.81 1.15 1.15
French vs Common 0.06 1.57 0.08 0.66 0.84 1.33
French vs German 0.38 0.90 0.09 0.72 0.42 1.03
French vs Scandinavian 0.66 0.01 1.09 0.95 0.60 0.75
a Significant at 1% level.
b Significant at 5% level.
c Significant at 10% level.
Public enforcement
Table IV
Disclosure and approval requirements were met
Prison term for Mr. James if 
he does not disclose
Country
This table presents data on measures of public enforcement regarding self-dealing transactions for 72 countries classified by their legal origin.   Definitions for each of the variables are given in Table I.  This 
table also reports tests of means by legal origin.
T-Stat
Approving parties Mr. James
Public enforcement 
indexApproval by disinterested shareholders 30.1605
c
[17.0429]
Ex-ante disclosure 50.2001
b
[23.8745]
Ex-ante private control of self-dealing 48.0959
b
[23.1395]
Disclosure in periodic filings 43.786
a
[15.8883]
Difficulty proving wrongdoing 55.0993
c
[28.4338]
Ex-post private control of self-dealing 70.9618
a
[25.5879]
Ln GDP/POP 23.9451
a 21.4156
a 23.1001
a 20.0926
a 20.1715
a 18.9961
a
[4.6644] [4.2830] [4.3733] [4.1511] [4.0394] [4.0953]
Time to collect on a bounced check -14.6453
c -14.3777
c -13.3685
c -16.1557
c -16.6180
c -15.2516
c
[8.3248] [7.5822] [7.3956] [9.3182] [8.8021] [8.4885]
Constant -74.1561 -70.2678 -83.4582
c -50.7705 -50.8626 -58.5579
[57.8757] [47.5839] [50.5655] [58.1494] [55.2684] [53.8109]
Observations 72 72 72 72 72 72
R-squared 0.40 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.40 0.43
Approval by disinterested shareholders -0.0834
b
[0.0340]
Ex-ante disclosure -0.0953
c
[0.0569]
Ex-ante private control of self-dealing -0.1101
c
[0.0484]
Disclosure in periodic filings -0.1306
c
[0.0690]
Difficulty proving wrongdoing -0.1170
[0.0868]
Ex-post private control of self-dealing -0.1908
b
[0.0941]
Ln GDP/POP -0.0288 -0.0218 -0.0272 -0.0090 -0.0111 -0.0055
[0.0193] [0.0181] [0.0192] [0.0154] [0.0168] [0.0156]
Time to collect on a bounced check 0.0454
b 0.0487
b 0.0435
b 0.0517
b 0.0509
b 0.0456
b
[0.0217] [0.0203] [0.0209] [0.0215] [0.0209] [0.0214]
Constant 0.1600 0.1106 0.1790 0.0113 0.0109 0.0388
[0.2721] [0.2658] [0.2780] [0.2286] [0.2333] [0.2291]
Observations 39 39 39 39 39 39
R-squared 0.27 0.25 0.28 0.29 0.24 0.30
Robust standard error values in brackets
a Significant at 1% level.
b Significant at 5% level.
c Significant at 10% level.
Panel A.  Dependent Variable:  Stock-market-capitalization-to-GDP ratio
Table V
Stock Market Capitalization and Control of Self-Dealing
Panel B.  Dependent Variable: Block Premium
This table presents results for OLS regressions for the sample of 72 countries.  The dependent
variables are stock-market-capitalization-to-GDP ratio (Panel A) and block premium (Panel B).
The independent variables are: (1) approval by disinterested shareholders; (2) ex-ante disclosure;
(3) ex-ante private control of self-dealing; (4) disclosure in periodic filings; (5) difficulty in
proving wrongdoing; (6) ex-post private control of self-dealing; (7) (logarithm) GDP per capita;
and (8) time to collect on a bounced check.   Table I provides definitions for the variables.
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Stock market 
capitalization to GDP
Block premium Ln Firms / Pop IPOs / GDP
Ownership 
concentration
Ln GDP/POP 23.1001
a -0.0272 0.6733
a 1.1758
a -0.0316
b
[4.3733] [0.0192] [0.0933] [0.2262] [0.0126]
Time to collect on a bounced check -13.3685
c 0.0435
b 0.0792 0.3780 0.0607
b
[7.3956] [0.0209] [0.1518] [0.5773] [0.0266]
Ex-ante control of private self-dealing 48.0959
b -0.1101
b 0.3851 2.5441
c 0.0044
[23.1395] [0.0484] [0.3768] [1.3563] [0.0563]
Constant -83.4582
c 0.1790 -3.8347
b -10.2604
b 0.4336
b
[50.5655] [0.2780] [1.3235] [4.2853] [0.2081]
Observations 72 39 72 49 49
R-squared 0.42 0.28 0.45 0.35 0.27
Stock market 
capitalization to GDP
Block premium Ln Firms / Pop IPOs / GDP
Ownership 
concentration
Ln GDP/POP 18.9961
a -0.0055 0.5985
a 1.0107
a -0.024
b
[4.0953] [0.0156] [0.1071] [0.2174] [0.0113]
Time to collect on a bounced check -15.2516
c 0.0456
b 0.1052 0.2978 0.0421
c
[8.4885] [0.0214] [0.1421] [0.5622] [0.0240]
Ex-post private control of self-dealing 70.9618
a -0.1908
b 1.3897
a 3.7405
b -0.1850
a
[25.5879] [0.0941] [0.4903] [1.5789] [0.0657]
Constant -58.5579 0.0388 -3.9224
a -9.6296
b 0.5727
a
[53.8109] [0.2291] [1.3041] [4.2082] [0.1612]
Observations 72 39 72 49 49
R-squared 0.43 0.3 0.49 0.36 0.36
Stock market 
capitalization to GDP
Block premium Ln Firms / Pop IPOs / GDP
Ownership 
concentration
Ln GDP/POP 20.9013
a -0.0194 0.6472
a 1.0884
a -0.0301
b
[4.1275] [0.0168] [0.0965] [0.2162] [0.0122]
Time to collect on a bounced check -11.9803
c 0.0393
c 0.1241 0.4953 0.0485
c
[6.7769] [0.0215] [0.1475] [0.5621] [0.0247]
Anti self-dealing index 83.7041
a -0.1791
b 1.0847
b 4.1413
b -0.0847
[33.1478] [0.0776] [0.4884] [1.7923] [0.0715]
Constant -91.6324
c 0.1750 -4.1868
a -11.1332
a 0.5253
a
[46.9993] [0.2684] [1.2988] [4.2791] [0.1808]
Observations 72 39 72 49 49
R-squared 0.45 0.31 0.47 0.38 0.29
Robust standard errors in brackets
a Significant at 1% level.
b Significant at 5% level.
c Significant at 10% level.
Table VI
Panel C:  Anti-self-dealing index
Panel A:  Ex-ante private control of self-dealing
Panel B:  Ex-post private control of self-dealing
Stock market development and the regulation of self-dealing
This table presents results for OLS regressions for the sample of 72 countries.  The dependent variables are (1) stock-market-
capitalization-to-GDP ratio; (2) block premium; (3) (logarithm) listed firms per million population; (4) IPOs-to-GDP; and (5) ownership
concentration.  The independent variables include: (1) ex-ante private control of self-dealing (Panel A); (2) ex-post private control of self-
dealing (Panel B); and (3) anti-self-dealing index (Panel C).  All regressions also include: (1) (logarithm) GDP per capita; and (2) time to
collect on a bounced check.   Table I provides definitions for the variables.  Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Stock market 
capitalization to GDP
Block premium Ln Firms / Pop IPOs / GDP
Ownership 
concentration
Ln GDP/POP 19.6642
a -0.0192 0.6347
a 1.0529
a -0.0288
b
[4.3327] [0.0166] [0.0981] [0.2187] [0.0125]
Time to collect on a bounced check -7.0659 0.0449
b 0.1738 0.7530 0.0391
[6.1241] [0.0226] [0.1455] [0.6423] [0.0274]
Anti-self-dealing index 144.0127
a -0.1340
c 1.6940
b 6.0566
b -0.1546
[47.5366] [0.0720] [0.7966] [2.5357] [0.1067]
Constant -133.3304
a 0.1209 -4.6080
a -13.0748
a 0.5961
a
[49.1809] [0.2638] [1.3773] [4.9534] [0.1840]
Observations 72 39 72 49 49
R-squared 0.40 0.30 0.46 0.36 0.27
Ln GDP/POP 0.0385
b
[0.0154]
Time to collect on a bounced check -0.0438
[0.0335]
Common law 0.3148
a
[0.0500]
Constant 0.2514
[0.2445]
Observations 72
R-squared 0.45
Robust standard error values in brackets
a Significant at 1% level.
b Significant at 5% level.
c Significant at 10% level.
Panel B: First-stage regression results for anti-self-dealing index
Panel A:  Second-stage regression results
Table VII
Instrumental variables regressions
This table presents results for IV regressions using common law as an instrument for the anti-self-dealing index.  The dependent variables
are (1) stock-market-capitalization-to-GDP ratio; (2) block premium; (3) (logarithm) listed firms per million population; (4) IPOs-to-GDP;
and (5) ownership concentration.  The independent variables include: (1) anti-self-dealing index; (2) (logarithm) GDP per capita; and (3)
time to collect on a bounced check.  Panel B presents the first-stage results for the anti-self-dealing index.  Table I provides definitions for
the variables.  Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.   Stock market 
capitalization to GDP
Block premium Ln Firms / Pop IPOs / Pop
Ownership 
concentration
Ln GDP/POP 23.3409
a -0.0285 0.6598
a 1.2429
a -0.0336
b
[4.6131] [0.0172] [0.1002] [0.2600] [0.0145]
Time to collect on a bounced check -18.4398
c 0.0506
b 0.0309 0.0395 0.0574
b
[9.8767] [0.0215] [0.1547] [0.6140] [0.0253]
Public enforcement -13.8088 0.0650
c 0.1834 -0.8511 0.0209
[14.5481] [0.0341] [0.3271] [1.0047] [0.0409]
Constant -36.0403 0.0811 -3.4065
a -7.8059
c 0.4608
b
[60.7170] [0.2341] [1.3136] [4.4091] [0.1992]
Observations 72 39 72 49 49
R-squared 0.37 0.25 0.44 0.30 0.27
Stock market 
capitalization to GDP
Block premium Ln Firms / Pop IPOs / Pop
Ownership 
concentration
Ln GDP/POP 21.7650
a -0.0214 0.6732
a 1.1210
a -0.0287
b
[4.0175] [0.0159] [0.0928] [0.2365] [0.0125]
Time to collect on a bounced check -18.0333
c 0.0647
a 0.0323 -0.0172 0.0569
b
[9.9211] [0.0232] [0.1535] [0.5970] [0.0246]
1.2903 0.0031 -0.0058 0.0718 -0.0048
[1.7628] [0.0046] [0.0291] [0.0635] [0.0037]
Constant -36.7872 -0.0461 -3.4231
a -7.1680
c 0.4549
b
[63.4297] [0.2326] [1.3025] [4.2631] [0.1835]
Observations 72 39 72 49 49
R-squared 0.37 0.22 0.44 0.3 0.29
Robust standard error values in brackets
a Significant at 1% level.
b Significant at 5% level.
c Significant at 10% level.
Table VIII
Regression results for public enforcement
Prison term for Mr. James if he does not 
disclose
Panel A:  Public enforcement when all disclosure and approval requirements have been met
Panel B:  Public enforcement when the transaction is approved by the CEO without disclosure
This table presents results for OLS regressions for the sample of 72 countries.  The dependent variables are (1) stock-market-capitalization-to-
GDP ratio; (2) block premium; (3) (logarithm) listed firms per million population; (4) IPOs-to-GDP; and (5) ownership concentration.  The
independent variables include: (1) public enforcement index (Panel A); and (2) prison term for Mr. James if he does not disclose (Panel B).  All
regressions also include: (1) (logarithm) GDP per capita; and (2) time to collect on a bounced check.   Table I provides definitions for the
variables.  Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.   Table IX 
Description of the revised anti-director rights index 
This table describes the revised anti-director index and its components.  The source of the data is 
the commercial laws of the various countries. 
 
 
Variable 
 
Description 
 
Vote by mail  Equals one if the law explicitly mandates or sets as a default rule that: (a) 
proxy solicitations paid by the company include a proxy form allowing 
shareholders to vote on the items on the agenda; or (b) a proxy form to vote on 
the items on the agenda accompanies notice to the meeting; or (c) shareholders 
vote by mail on the items on the agenda (i.e. postal ballot); and zero otherwise. 
 
Shares not deposited  Equals 1 if the law rule does not require, nor explicitly permits companies to 
require, shareholders to deposit with the company or another firm any of their 
shares prior to a general shareholders meeting. 
 
Cumulative  voting  Equals one if the law explicitly mandates or sets as a default rule that 
shareholders owning 10% or less of the capital may cast all their votes for one 
board of directors or supervisory board candidate (cumulative voting) or if the 
law explicitly mandates or sets as a default rule a mechanism of proportional 
representation in the board of directors or supervisory board by which 
shareholders owning 10% or less of the capital stock may name a proportional 
number of directors to the board, and zero otherwise. 
 
Oppressed minority  Index of the difficulty faced by (minority) shareholders owning 10% or less of 
the capital stock in challenging (i.e. by either seeking damages or having the 
transaction rescinded) resolutions that benefit controlling shareholders and 
damage the company.  Equals one if minority shareholders may challenge a 
resolution of both the shareholders and the board (of directors or, if available, 
of supervisors) if it is unfair, prejudicial, oppressive, or abusive; equals one-
half if shareholders are able to challenge either a resolution of the shareholders 
or of the board (of directors or, if available, of supervisors) if it is unfair, 
prejudicial, or oppressive; equals zero otherwise. 
 
Pre-emptive rights  Equals one when the law or listing rules explicitly mandate or set as a default 
rule that shareholders hold the first opportunity to buy new issues of stock; 
equals zero otherwise. 
 
Capital to call a meeting  The  minimum  percentage  of share capital [or voting power] that the law 
mandates or sets as a default rule as entitling a single shareholder to call a 
shareholders' meeting (directly or through the court).  Define capital to equal 
one when capital to call a meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent and zero 
otherwise. 
 
Anti-director rights index  Aggregate index of shareholder rights.  The index is formed by summing: (1) 
vote by mail; (2) shares not blocked or deposited; (3) cumulative voting; (4) 
oppressed minority; (5) pre-emptive rights; and (6) capital. 
 
 Regression results for the anti-director rights index
Stock market 
capitalization to GDP
Block premium Ln Firms / Pop IPOs to GDP
Ownership 
concentration
Ln GDP/POP 18.0808
a -0.0120 0.5160
a 1.2003
a -0.0337
a
[5.1853] [0.0166] [0.0772] [0.2245] [0.0105]
Time to collect on a bounced check -24.8784
b 0.0496
a -0.2359 0.2662 0.0405
c
[10.6914] [0.0176] [0.1911] [0.5687] [0.0237]
Anti-director rights index-- LLSV 98 14.3777
a -0.0346
a 0.2608
a 0.6030
b -0.0357
a
[5.5806] [0.0134] [0.1004] [0.2716] [0.0112]
Constant 2.4869 0.0667 -1.5440 -10.757
b 0.6658
a
[69.1489] [0.2226] [1.6414] [4.3433] [0.1722]
Observations 49 37 49 49 49
R-squared 0.40 0.32 0.57 0.35 0.37
Stock market 
capitalization to GDP
Block premium Ln Firms / Pop IPOs to GDP
Ownership 
concentration
Ln GDP/POP 22.3752
a -0.0195 0.6595
a 1.2173
a -0.0342
a
[4.3003] [0.0160] [0.0871] [0.2334] [0.0111]
Time to collect on a bounced check -14.0437 0.0561
b 0.2300 0.4616 0.0346
[8.8830] [0.0244] [0.1560] [0.5793] [0.0250]
Anti-director rights index -- Revised 10.0045
c -0.0077 0.4085
a 0.6824
b -0.0330
b
[5.5485] [0.0246] [0.1377] [0.3388] [0.0165]
Constant -90.1826 0.0262 -5.7406
a -12.4998
a 0.7086
a
[63.2923] [0.2508] [1.4929] [4.7684] [0.1861]
Observations 72 39 72 49 49
R-squared 0.39 0.21 0.53 0.34 0.32
Robust standard error values in brackets
a Significant at 1% level.
b Significant at 5% level.
c Significant at 10% level.
Panel B: Revised anti-director rights index
Panel A:  Anti-director rights index from LLSV
Table X
This table presents results for OLS regressions.  The dependent variables are (1) stock-market-capitalization-to-GDP ratio; (2) block
premium; (3) (logarithm) listed firms per million population; (4) IPOs-to-GDP; and (5) ownership concentration.  The independent
variables include: (1) anti-director rights index from La Porta et al. 1998 (Panel A); and (2) the revised anti-directors index.  All
regressions also include: (1) (logarithm) GDP per capita; and (2) time to collect on a bounced check.   Table IX provides definitions for
the revised anti-directors index.  Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.   Stock market 
capitalization to GDP
Block premium Ln Firms / Pop IPOs / GDP
Ownership 
concentration
Ln GDP/POP 20.9381
a -0.0161 0.6570
a 1.1073
a -0.0345
a
[4.1687] [0.0164] [0.0892] [0.2255] [0.0111]
Time to collect on a bounced check -11.5689
c 0.0526
b 0.2342 0.5543 0.0348
[6.9960] [0.0233] [0.1582] [0.5793] [0.0248]
Anti-self-dealing index 80.1685
b -0.2313
c 0.1384 3.7314 0.0102
[33.7653] [0.1213] [0.5989] [2.2708] [0.0993]
Anti-directors index (revised) 1.4711 0.0272 0.3938
b 0.1489 -0.0345
[4.0338] [0.0342] [0.1660] [0.3881] [0.0234]
Constant -97.4845
c 0.0035 -5.7532
a -11.9315
a 0.7101
a
[52.0209] [0.2715] [1.5114] [4.7002] [0.1914]
Observations 72 39 72 49 49
R-squared 0.45 0.33 0.53 0.38 0.32
Stock market 
capitalization to GDP
Block premium Ln Firms / Pop IPOs / GDP
Ownership 
concentration
Ln GDP/POP 16.8237
a -0.0122 0.4860
a 1.1513
a -0.0333
a
[5.3006] [0.0143] [0.0772] [0.2033] [0.0113]
Time to collect on a bounced check -15.2793 0.0321 -0.0575 0.9435
c 0.0253
[11.1004] [0.0211] [0.2032] [0.5180] [0.0242]
Anti-self-dealing index 29.1189 -0.0502 0.8933 1.157 0.0697
[50.5557] [0.1004] [0.7095] [2.0634] [0.0848]
Disclosure in the prospectus 85.6991
b -0.2367
c 1.2702
c 5.3915
a -0.2791
a
[37.9210] [0.1305] [0.6708] [1.6298] [0.0898]
Constant -58.2786 0.2264 -2.6107 -15.8069
a 0.7672
a
[83.4718] [0.2332] [1.6387] [4.0788] [0.1900]
Observations 49 37 49 49 49
R-squared 0.44 0.39 0.62 0.46 0.40
Stock market 
capitalization to GDP
Block premium Ln Firms / Pop IPOs / GDP
Ownership 
concentration
Ln GDP/POP 15.6724
a -0.0165 0.4687
a 1.0772
a -0.0297
b
[5.1477] [0.0154] [0.0787] [0.1982] [0.0124]
Time to collect on a bounced check -17.0216 0.0353 -0.0744 0.8957 0.0345
[10.8912] [0.0203] [0.1980] [0.6122] [0.0233]
Anti-self-dealing index 59.4717 -0.1354
b 1.3149
b 2.8702 -0.0401
[41.3254] [0.0650] [0.5199] [1.7404] [0.0742]
Prospectus liability 54.7649
a -0.1192
b 0.9025
c 4.0749
a -0.1430
b
[21.3554] [0.0572] [0.4723] [1.2694] [0.0610]
Constant -28.0906 0.2034 -2.2363 -14.4146
a 0.6405
a
[74.8109] [0.2561] [1.6343] [4.5837] [0.1764]
Observations 49 37 49 49 49
R-squared 0.43 0.37 0.61 0.46 0.34
Robust standard errors in brackets
a Significant at 1% level.
b Significant at 5% level.
c Significant at 10% level.
Table XI
Horse race between anti-self-dealing and other proxies for investor protection 
Panel A:  Controlling for the revised anti-directors index
Panel B:  Controlling for disclosure in the prospectus
Panel C:  Controlling for prospectus liability
This table presents results for OLS regressions for the sample of 72 countries.  The dependent variables are (1) stock-market-capitalization-
to-GDP ratio; (2) block premium; (3) (logarithm) listed firms per million population; (4) IPOs-to-GDP; and (5) ownership concentration.
All regressions include: (1) anti-self-dealing index; (2) (logarithm) GDP per capita; and (3) time to collect on a bounced check.
Regressions also control for: (1) the revised anti-directors index (Panel A); (2) disclosure in the prospectus (Panel B); and (3) prospectus
liability (Panel C).  The revised anti-directors index is defined in Table XII.  All other variables are defined in Table I.  Robust standard
errors are shown in parentheses.  Stock market 
capitalization to GDP
Block premium Ln Firms / Pop IPOs / GDP
Ownership 
concentration
Ln GDP/POP 9.9842 -0.022 0.5159
a 1.1801
b -0.0343
c
[7.1655] [0.0237] [0.1543] [0.4791] [0.0194]
Time to collect on a bounced check -13.8431 0.0321 0.1742 0.7814 0.0418
[9.0651] [0.0246] [0.1932] [0.6555] [0.0269]
Anti-self-dealing 44.1097 -0.1838
c 0.6832 4.1115 -0.0079
[51.8846] [0.0993] [0.5660] [2.4821] [0.0875]
Tax Evasion 13.0330
b -0.0060 0.2881
a 0.1380 -0.0136
[6.3722] [0.0147] [0.0783] [0.3410] [0.0103]
Constant -20.9171 0.2715 -4.5621
a -14.095
a 0.6226
a
[59.6363] [0.2943] [1.7908] [5.4733] [0.2375]
Observations 47 37 47 39 39
Pseudo R-squared 0.44 0.35 0.64 0.31 0.32
Stock market 
capitalization to GDP
Block premium Ln Firms / Pop IPOs / GDP
Ownership 
concentration
Ln GDP/POP 10.2115 -0.0119 0.4038
a 1.2636
a -0.0487
a
[6.8331] [0.0195] [0.1110] [0.3919] [0.0169]
Time to collect on a bounced check -6.2111 0.0284 0.0329 1.1629
b 0.0250
[13.3539] [0.0212] [0.1767] [0.5242] [0.0251]
Disclosure in the prospectus 92.4098
b -0.2714
b 1.2336
b 7.3585
a -0.2275
a
[42.6754] [0.1175] [0.6036] [2.0777] [0.0852]
Tax Evasion 11.6066
b -0.0080 0.2773
a 0.0789 -0.0005
[5.6395] [0.0154] [0.0663] [0.2611] [0.0111]
Constant -88.5853 0.2817 -3.2411
b -19.0407
a 0.9206
a
[88.4167] [0.2452] [1.5422] [4.6014] [0.2137]
Observations 39 35 39 39 39
Pseudo R-squared 0.42 0.43 0.72 0.4 0.4
Stock market 
capitalization to GDP
Block premium Ln Firms / Pop IPOs / GDP
Ownership 
concentration
Ln GDP/POP 23.0029
a -0.0309 0.3106
c 0.9111
a 0.0034
[4.5475] [0.0213] [0.1656] [0.3439] [0.0212]
Time to collect on a bounced check -11.7426 0.0424
c 0.0339 0.5593 0.0364
[7.1449] [0.0242] [0.1410] [0.6064] [0.0265]
Anti-self-dealing 83.4879
b -0.1735
b 1.1679
b 4.2735
b -0.1097
[33.4857] [0.0821] [0.5225] [1.9087] [0.0709]
Ln newspaper circulation per capita -4.1207 0.0182 0.5580
b 0.3088 -0.0583
c
[5.4529] [0.0311] [0.2361] [0.5943] [0.0304]
Constant -91.0437
a 0.1702 -3.4757
a -11.4414
b 0.5835
a
[49.1494] [0.2763] [1.1682] [4.5814] [0.1737]
Observations 71 39 71 49 49
Pseudo R-squared 0.45 0.31 0.53 0.38 0.34
Robust standard errors in brackets
a Significant at 1% level.
b Significant at 5% level.
c Significant at 10% level.
Panel A:  Tax Evasion and Anti-self-dealing
Panel C:  (Log) Newspaper circulation per capita
Table XII -- Alternative Hypotheses
Panel B:  Tax Evasion and Disclosure in the prospectus
This table presents results for OLS regressions for the sample of 72 countries.  The dependent variables are (1) stock-market-
capitalization-to-GDP ratio; (2) block premium; (3) (logarithm) listed firms per million population; (4) IPOs-to-GDP; and (5)
ownership concentration.  All regressions include: (1) (logarithm) GDP per capita; and (2) time to collect on a bounced check.
Regressions also control for: (1) tax evasion and anti-self-dealing (Panel A); (2) tax evasion and disclosure in the prospectus
(Panel B); and (3) (logarithm) newspaper circulation per capita and anti-self-dealing (Panel C). Table I provides definitions for the
variables.  Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  Common law 0.2939
a 0.3007
a
[0.0580] [0.0597]
Proportional Representation -0.0446
c 0.0055
[0.0246] [0.0213]
Constant 0.3503
a 0.5200
a 0.3389
a
[0.0246] [0.0567] [0.0520]
Observations 62 62 62
R-squared 0.36 0.06 0.36
Civil law Common law
Proportional Representation 0.0070 0.0028
[0.0251] [0.0370]
Constant 0.3357
a 0.6418
a
[0.0594] [0.0692]
Observations 42 20
R-squared -0.02 -0.05
Above Median Below Median
Common law 0.4168
a 0.1918
b
[0.0494] [0.0875]
Constant 0.3452
a 0.3559
a
[0.0273] [0.0415]
Observations 31 31
R-squared 0.68 0.13
Robust standard errors in brackets
a Significant at 1% level.
b Significant at 5% level.
c Significant at 10% level.
Table XIII
Panel B: Common versus civil law
Panel C: High versus low competitiveness of the 
legislature
Panel A: OLS regressions 
Dependent Variable:  Anti-self-dealing index
Legal Origin and Proportional Representation
This table presents results for regressions for the sample of 62 countries that have data on
proportional representation and the regulation of self-dealing.  The dependent variable is the
anti-self-dealing index. Panel A shows OLS regressions that control for: (1) Common law;
and (2) proportional representation.  Panel B presents SURE regressions for civil and
common law countries using proportional representation as the independent variable.
Finally, Panel C shows SURE regressions for countries above and below the median in
competitiveness of the legislature using common law as the independent variable. Table I
provides definitions for the variables.  Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  E
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Ex-post private control self-dealing 0.3553
Anti-self-dealing index 0.8777
a 0.7597
a
Jail James -- no disclosure 0.1093 0.2030 0.1800
Public enforcement -0.1591 0.0010 -0.1102 0.0487
Antidirectors index (revised) 0.3607 0.5879
a -0.0360 0.0908 0.5522
a
Disclosure in prospectus 0.5104
b 0.6875
a 0.2310 -0.1528 0.6733
a 0.5916
a
Prospectus liability 0.2213 0.5694
a 0.0998 -0.0681 0.4247 0.4469 0.5479
a
Market capitalization to GDP 0.2886 0.4554
a 0.2393 -0.0099 0.4341
b 0.2753 0.4938
b 0.4262
Block premium -0.3412 -0.4758 -0.0286 0.2126 -0.4580 -0.2440 -0.5839
b -0.4529 -0.4765
Ln(Firms / POP) 0.0671 0.4136
b 0.1410 0.1664 0.2587 0.3206 0.4681
c 0.4180 0.4940
a -0.5301
b
IPOs / GDP 0.2861 0.4195 0.2200 0.0344 0.3941 0.2227 0.4368 0.4246 0.6537
a -0.4641 0.5916
a
Ownership concentration -0.1330 -0.4872
b -0.2737 0.0025 -0.3262 -0.3646 -0.4991
b -0.4166 -0.3131 0.4993 -0.4251 -0.4743
b
Time to collect on bounced check -0.2647 -0.2001 -0.1367 0.0257 -0.2867 -0.3342 -0.4670
c -0.4050 -0.2985 0.4243 -0.0623 -0.1797 0.4080
Ln(GDP/POP) -0.0116 0.3284 0.2391 0.1694 0.1602 0.0718 0.1367 0.1700 0.5537
a -0.2726 0.6646
a 0.5398
a -0.4282 -0.1221
Tax evasion 0.2400 0.5997
a 0.2485 0.1670 0.4595 0.3519 0.4522 0.3795 0.6271
a -0.4952 0.7254
a 0.4239 -0.4831 -0.4405 0.6380
a
Newspaper circulation -0.0733 0.2264 0.1368 0.2031 0.0647 0.1273 0.0791 0.1082 0.3511 -0.2367 0.5546
a 0.3546 -0.5338
b -0.1369 0.7137
a 0.5265
b
Proportional representation -0.2112 -0.2038 -0.1728 0.0437 -0.2483 -0.2018 -0.5671
a -0.2342 -0.1232 0.2403 0.1117 -0.2395 0.2311 0.3483 0.2682 -0.3366 0.2576
English Legal Origin 0.4317
b 0.5861
a 0.1367 -0.1359 0.6007
a 0.4707
a 0.5918
a 0.3377 0.2686 -0.3355 0.0474 0.1795 -0.1572 -0.1831 -0.1568 0.4133 -0.1857 -0.4557
b
a Significant at 1% level.
b Significant at 5% level.
c Significant at 10% level.
Appendix.  Correlation Table
This table presents the correlations among the main variables in the paper. 
 
 
 
 
Figure I.  Case facts.  Buyer Co. (“Buyer”) is a food manufacturer company.  It is a publicly 
traded firm that is listed on the country’s largest stock exchange.  Buyer manufactures and 
distributes all of its products itself.    
 
Mr. James is Buyer’s controlling shareholder and a member of Buyer’s board of directors.  He 
owns 60% of Buyer, and elected 2 directors to Buyer’s 5-member board of directors.  Buyer’s 
CEO is the son of Mr. James.  
 
Mr. James also owns 90% of Seller Company, which operates a chain of retail hardware stores.  
Seller recently shut a large number of its stores.  As a result, its fleet of trucks is not being 
utilized. 
 
Mr. James proposes to Buyer that Buyer purchase Seller’s unused fleet of trucks to expand 
Buyer’s distribution of its food products.  Buyer agrees.  The final terms of the transaction 
require Buyer to pay to Seller in cash an amount equal to 10% of Buyer’s assets in exchange for 
the trucks.  The transaction is part of Buyer’s ordinary course of business and is not ultra vires. 
 
Buyer enters into the transaction.  All required approvals are obtained and all the required 
disclosures made.  The transaction might be unfair to Buyer.  Shareholders sue the interested 
parties and the approving body. 
 
 
Seller Co. 
Buyer Co. buys equipment from Seller Co. 
Mr. James owns 60% of 
Buyer Co. shares 
Mr. James owns 90% 
of Seller Co. shares 
Mr. James 
Buyer Co.  
 
Figure II:  Partial-regression plot of stock market capitalization and ex-ante control of self-
dealing in regressions that control for (log) income per capita and efficiency of the judiciary. 
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Figure III:  Partial-regression plot of stock market capitalization and ex-post control of self-
dealing in regressions that control for (log) income per capita and efficiency of the judiciary.  
 
 
Figure IV:   Partial-regression plot of block premium against the ex-ante control of self-dealing 
in regressions that control for (log) income per capita and efficiency of the judiciary. 
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Figure V:   Partial-regression plot of block premium against the ex-post control of self-dealing 
in regressions that control for (log) income per capita and efficiency of the judiciary.  
Figure VI:   Partial-regression plot of block premium and the anti-self-dealing index in 
regressions that control for (log) income per capita and efficiency of the judiciary. 
Netherlands
Venezuela
Philippines
Egypt
Mexico
Germany
Brazil
Switzerland
Austria
Norway
Sweden Spain
Turkey
Korea (Rep.)
Japan
Denmark
Czech Rep.
France
Argentina
Poland Finland
United States
Portugal
Peru Italy
Taiwan
Chile
Indonesia
Colombia
South Africa
Canada
Israel
New Zealand
Thailand
Australia
Hong Kong
Singapore
Malaysia
United Kingdom
-
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
 
b
l
o
c
k
 
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
Residual anti-self-dealing index
coef = -.17912243, (robust) se = .07763217, t = -2.31Tunisia
Netherlands
Ukraine
Venezuela
Ecuador
Panama
Jordan
Mexico
Uruguay
Egypt
Germany
Hungary
Philippines Switzerland
Iceland
Bolivia
Greece
Luxembourg
Austria
Brazil
Kenya
Croatia
Sweden Norway
Latvia
Spain
France
Lithuania
El Salvador Denmark
Czech Rep.
Jamaica
Japan
Argentina
Korea (Rep.)
Slovak Rep.
Turkey
Uganda
Poland
Zimbabwe
Finland
Russia
Kazahkstan Belgium
Romania
Italy
Portugal
Sri Lanka
Nigeria
Pakistan
United States
Peru Taiwan
India
Morocco
Chile
Ghana
Colombia
Canada
Indonesia Ireland
Israel
Bulgaria
South Africa
Australia
China
New Zealand
Hong Kong
Thailand
Singapore
United Kingdom
Malaysia
-
4
-
2
0
2
4
R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
 
L
n
(
f
i
r
m
s
-
t
o
-
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
)
-.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
Residual anti-self-dealing index
coef = 1.0847465, (robust) se = .48839839, t = 2.22
 
 
Figure VII:   Partial-regression plot of (log) listed firms per million population and the anti-self-
dealing index in regressions that control for (log) income per capita and efficiency of the 
judiciary. Netherlands
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Figure VIII:   Partial-regression plot of IPOs-to-GDP against the index of anti-self-dealing in 
regressions that control for (log) income per capita and efficiency of the judiciary.  
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Figure IX:   Partial-regression plot of stock market capitalization against public enforcement 
when the transaction is approved by the CEO –the son of the controlling shareholder-- without 
disclosure (left graph) and when all approval and disclosure requirements are met (right graph) in 
regressions that control for (log) income per capita and efficiency of the judiciary. Kenya
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Figure X:   Partial-regression plot of anti-self-dealing index against proportional representation 
in common law countries (left graph) and civil law ones (right graph) in regressions that control 
for (log) income per capita and efficiency of the judiciary. Sweden
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Figure XI:   Partial-regression plot of anti-self-dealing index against proportional legal origin for 
countries with high (left graph) and low (right graph) competitiveness of the legislature in 
regressions that control for (log) income per capita and efficiency of the judiciary. 
 
 